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THE WILLS BRANCH OF THE WORTHIER
TITLE DOCTRINE*

Joseph W. Morrisf

I.

INTRODUCTION

"page of history iSt worth a volume of logic" 1 when it comes
to understanding real property concepts.2 This is especially
true when dealing with the wills branch of the worthier title doctrine. 3 For the wills branch, like the inter vivos branch of the
doctrine,4 had its origin in the English feudal society. Indeed, at
its inception it seems to have been inseparably bound to that society. It was, therefore, a rule which eventually became no longer

A

• This article is a part of a dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of
Michigan Law School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the S.J.D. degree. In
the preparation of this paper the author is deeply indebted to Professor Lewis M. Simes
for his helpful criticisms and suggestions.
t A.B. 1943, LL.B. 1947, Washburn University; LL.M. 1948, S.J.D. 1955, University of
Michigan; member, Kansas and Oklahoma bars.-Ed.
1 Holmes, J., in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 at 349, 41 S.Ct. 506 (1921).
2 Justice Cardozo went even further. He said: "Let me speak first of those fields where
there can be no progress without history. I think the law of real property supplies the
readiest example." CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 54 (1921). It is also
interesting to note that Justice Cardozo wrote the opinion in the leading case in the
United States involving the inter vivos branch of the worthier title doctrine. See Doctor
v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
3 For brevity and convenience the wills branch of the worthier title doctrine will
hereinafter be referred to as the "wills branch," the "rule" or the "doctrine." In general,
on the wills branch see I AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §4.19 (1952); 3 POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY §381 (1952); Harper and Heckel, "The Doctrine of Worthier Title," 24 ILL. L.
REv. 627 (1930); comments, 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 507 (1952); 1952 WASH. UNIV. L. REv.
117; notes, 39 IOWA L. REv. 199 (1953); 49 MICH. L. REv. 1066 (1951); 46 HARV. L. REv. 993
(1933); 14 N.C.L. REv. 90 (1935); 16 TENN. L. REv. 358 (1940). For an amusing account
involving the wills branch as it relates to title problems see Crocker, "The History of a
Title, A Conveyancer's Romance," AM. L. REv., Oct. 1875, reprinted in PATION, TITLES
§34, n. 85 (1938).
4 Professor Warren thought it improper to link together the inter vivos and the wills
branch of the worthier title doctrine. He observed: "The heir-devisee rule is dead or
dying. It has outlived whatever usefulness it ever had. It is in a state of nocuous desuetude. The restaters have recognized this. They have themselves recommended its legislative repeal. But the ruling against a remainder to a grantor's heirs is a living, growing
rule,-very sensible and very serviceable. A similar rule has been evolved applicable to
personal property. A liaison between the quick and the dead is not fitting. Why tie a
bull-pup to the tail of a dead cat?" Warren, "A Remainder to the Grantor's Heirs," 22
TEX. L. REv. 22 at 27-28 (1943).
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useful and was accordingly abolished in England by statute.5
Strange though it may seem to the layman and even to the lawyer,
it is nevertheless a fact that many a rule long since abolished in
England still exists in the United States. It is the writer's view
that we are here concerned with just such a rule. Indeed, it might
well be said that there would be little if. any justification for this
paper if it were settled law that this rule was nonexistent in the
United States.6 However, before we can understand its modern
consequences, a knowledge of its historical setting and application
are essential. It is, therefore, the purpose of this article to examine
the history and origin of the wills branch of the worthier title
doctrine, to ascertain the extent of its application and the manner
of its application, to determine the legal consequences flowing
therefrom, and to consider the desirability of its continued existence. No treatment will be given here to the inter vivos branch of
the worthier title doctrine, since it has been the subject of a previous paper. 7
A definitive statement of a legal proposition is frequently too
inclusive or too exclusive, yet it seems that if such a statement
can be made with accuracy it is eminently desirable. It gives the
reader, especially if he is not familiar with the subject matter, a
starting point. It affords to all of us a common place to begin
our thinking. s·ubject to the qualifications hereafter discussed,
the rule of the English common law, forming the basis of this paper,
may be stated as follows:

A devise of a present or future interest in land to the heir of
the testator, either by name or in form, is void if the heir takes b)1
virtue of the devise precisely the same interest he would have taken
if the devise had been stricken out of the will.

IL

HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF THE RULE

It was about the middle of the sixteenth century when the wills
branch of the worthier titJe doctrine made its appearance. 8 Thereafter it grew and expanded steadily; in fact its formulation and
development cover a span of almost three centuries. Unlike the
rule in Shelley's Case or the rule in Wild's Case, this rule is not
5 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 106, §3 (1833).
6 For a discussion of the rule in the United States, see Part VIII infra.
7 See Morris, "Inter Vivos Branch of Worthier Title Doctrine," 2 OKLA. L. R.Ev. 133
(1949).
s Hinde v. Lyon, 2 Dyer 124a, 73 Eng. Rep. 271 (1555).
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identified with any particular decision. 9 Rather, it seems to have
developed step by step and case by case not unlike the development of the rule against perpetuities.10 Generally speaking, the
rule was applied in two classes of cases: (1) those in which the
devise was to an individual who was in fact the testator's heir, and
(2) those in which the devise was in form to the testator's "heirs at
law."

A.

A Devise to an Individual Who Was in Fact the
Heir of the Testator

It became thoroughly engrained as a part of the English common law that an heir of the testator could not take by purchase
under a will an interest in land which was precisely the same as
that which he would have taken if no devise to him had been
made.11 For example, if T devised land to A, his only son and heir,
the devise to A was void, and he took by descent instead of under
the will. In Hargrave's note to Coke on Littleton, it is said: "One
leading principle, which this and the other authorities seem clearly
to establish, is, that whenever a devise gives to the heir the same
estate in quality as he would have by descent, he shall take by the
latter, which is the title most favoured by the law... .''12
It is interesting at this point to compare this rule with the
inter vivos branch of the doctrine. The inter vivos branch applied
only if the limitation was in form to the grantor's "heirs." It can
thus be seen that this rule was very different. Its application was
much broader; that is to say, if the devise were to an individual
by name, and if at the time of the testator's death that individual
9 It has been stated that the inter vivos branch of the doctrine is known as the "Rule
in Bingham's Case." PATION, TITLES §133 (1938). This is the only statement with which
the writer is familiar wherein either branch of the doctrine has been linked to any single

case.
10 For a case by case development of the rule, see Harper and Heckel, "Doctrine of
Worthier Title," 24 Iu.. L. R.Ev. 627 (1930).
11 Hinde v. Lyon, 2 Dyer 124a, 73 Eng. Rep. 271 (1555); Bashpool's Case, 2 Leo. IOI,
74 Eng. Rep. 392 (1585); Hainsworth v. Pretty, Cro. Eliz. 919, 78 Eng. Rep. 1140 (1602);
Preston v. Holmes, Sty. 148, 82 Eng. Rep. 601 (1648); Hedger v. Rowe, 3 Lev. 127, 83
Eng. Rep. 612 (1682); Clerk v. Smith, I Salk. 242, 91 Eng. Rep. 214 (1698); Emerson v.
Inchbird, 1 Ld. Raym. 728, 91 Eng. Rep. 1386 (1702); Smith v. Triggs, I Strange 487, 93
Eng. Rep. 651 (1721); Allam v. Heber, 2 Strange 1270, 93 Eng. Rep. 1174 (1748); Hurst
v. Earl of Winchelsea, 2 Burr. 879, 97 Eng. Rep. 611 (1759); Chaplin v. Leroux, 5 M. &: S.
14, 105 Eng. Rep. 957 (1816); Doe v. Timins, I B. &: Ald. 530, 106 Eng. Rep. 195 (1818);
Manbridge v. Plummer, 2 My. &: K.. 93, 39 Eng. Rep. 879 (1833); Strickland v. Strickland,
10 Sim. 374, 59 Eng. Rep. 659 (1839); Biederman v. Seymour, 3 Beav. 368, 49 Eng. Rep.
144 (1840); Rolle's Abr. 626 (1668); 2 BLACKST. COh-lM. 241-242; POWELL, DEVISES 420
(1788).
12 l Co. Lrrr. 12b, note (1832).
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happened to be the testator's heir at law, the rule applied and the
individual took by descent instead of under the will. So the rule
applied if the devise was to the testator's daughter,13 his granddaughter,14 or his grandson.15 Of course, by far the greatest number of cases arose when the devise was to the testator's eldest son.16
This was brought about by the doctrine of primogeniture. Since
the eldest son was the heir at law, the land descended to him unless
by custom a different mode of descent had been established.17 It
was natural, therefore, that many of these cases arose because frequently a testator would devise land to his eldest son.
Perhaps it should also be pointed out that this rule applied to
both present interests (possessory estates) and to future interests,18
whereas the inter vivos branch of the doctrine applied to future
interests only. Thus, if T, by his will, devised land in fee simple
to A, his eldest son, the rule was applied and A took by descent.19
Likewise, if T attempted to create a future interest in A, his son
and heir, by devising land to W for life, remainder to A in fee,
the rule was applied and A took a reversion by descent instead of
a remainder by purchase.20

B.

A Devise in Form to "Heirs" or "Right Heirs" of the Testator

As heretofore indicated, the doctrine likewise applied if the
devise was in form to the testator's "heirs at law." Here, if a
testator devised land in form to "my heirs" or my "right heirs," the
devise was void and the heir took by descent. 21 Seemingly, however, there was less insistence by the English courts in these cases
that the quantity and quality of the estate devised be the same.22
13 Smith v. Triggs, I Strange 487, 93 Eng. Rep. 651 (1721).
14 Manbridge

v. Plummer, 2 My. & K.. 93, 39 Eng. Rep. 879 (1833).
v. Smith, I Salk. 241, 91 ,Eng. Rep. 214 (1698); Doe v. Timins, I B. & Aid.
531, 106 Eng. Rep. 195 (1818).
16 Hinde v. Lyon, 2 Dyer 124a, 73 Eng. Rep. 271 (1555); Preston v. Holmes, Sty. 148,
82 Eng. Rep. 601 (1648); Hainsworth v. Pretty, Cro. Eliz. 919, 78 Eng. Rep. 1140 (1602);
Emerson v. lnchbird, I Ld. Raym. 728, 91 Eng. Rep. 1386 (1702); Hurst v. Earl of
Winchelsea, 2 Burr. 879, 97 Eng. Rep. 611 (1759). Dictum in Paramour v. Yardly, 2 Plow.
539, 75 Eng. Rep. 794 at 803 (1579).
17 Bear's Case, 1 Leo. 112, 74 Eng. Rep. 105 (1589). See Neilson, "Custom and the
Common Law in Kent," 38 HARv. L. REv. 482 (1925).
;J.S See Part V-B-4 infra.
19 Hainsworth v. Pretty, Cro. Eliz. 919, 78 Eng. Rep. 1140 (1602).
20 Preston v. Holmes, Sty. 148, 82 Eng. Rep. 601 (1648).
21 Counden v. Clerk, Hob. 29, 80 Eng. Rep. , 180 (1868); Nottingham v. Jennings, I
Comyns 81, 92 Eng. Rep. 970 (1700); Godolphin v. Abingdon, 2 Atk. 57, 26 Eng. Rep. 432
(1740); Doe v. Maxey, 12 East 589, 104 Eng. Rep. 230 (1810); dictum, Pibus v. Mitford,
I Vent. 372, 86 Eng. Rep. 239 (1674); I HARGRAVE, LAW TRACTS 571 (1787).
22 For a discussion concerning the quantity and quality of the estate devised see Parts
V-A and B.

15 Clerk
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At least this conclusion appears warranted by the language used
in the cases. For example, in Counden v. Clerk23 a testator devised land to his son John, but if John should die without lawful
issue, then unto the "right heirs" male of the testator. The court
held that the devise to the heirs of the testator was void "for this
is a positive rule, that a man cannot raise a fee-simple to his own
right heirs by the name of heirs, as a purchase, neither by conveyance of land, nor by use, nor by devise."24 This case was approved
in Godolphin v. Abingdon.25
Likewise in Doe v. Maxey 26 the court again failed to stress
that the estate devised had to be of the same quantity and quality
before the rule applied. There, certain estates tail had been devised, with "an ultimate remainder to the testator's own right
heirs forever." In commenting on this end limitation, the court
observed that "it was unnecessary for him to devise, for it remained notwithstanding in him as an undisposed reversion, and descended to his own right heirs.... And the only operation of such
a devise in terms is to exclude a conclusion that any other person
was intended to take it; for certainly his heirs would take by descent and not by the will."
It can thus be seen that this type of a limitation in a will and
the rule applied thereto bore close resemblance to the inter vivos
branch of the doctrine. Indeed, counsel pointed this out in Doe
v. Maxey by saying, "A limitation to the heirs of a third person
may operate as a contingent remainder; but a limitation by deed
or will to the right heirs of the grantor or devisor. . . is only the
old reversion." 27 Hence, it would seem that here, as in the rule
in Shelley's Case and as in the inter vivos branch of the worthier
title doctrine, if the language was in the form to the "heirs" of
the testator Lhe English courts in effect construed the word "heirs"
as a word of limitation. . Nor is it surprising to find the rule being
applied in this fashion, for there is fully as much justification here
to treat the word "heirs" as a word of limitation as there is in the
rule in Shelley's Case or in the inter vivas branch of the doctrine.
Indeed, a contrary treatment would hardly have been understandable, since the real reason for treating the word "heirs" as a word
of limitation was the same in all three cases.28
23 Hob. 29, 80 Eng. Rep. 180 (1868).
24 80 Eng. Rep. 180 at 181. !Wies added.
252 Atk. 57, 26 Eng. Rep. 432 (1740).
26 12 East 589, 104 Eng. Rep. 230 at 235 (1810).
21 104 Eng. Rep. 230. !Wies added.
28 See Part III infra.
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A Rule of Law

This rule was a rule of law dictated by the policy of the age,
not merely a rule of construction.29 In the early case of Preston
• v. Holmes, 30 this was made unequivocally clear. In that case the
testator devised land to his wife for life with a remainder in fee
to his eldest son John. The question was whether John took by·
purchase under the will or by descent. It was argued that John
could elect either to take under the will or by descent, whichever he chose. In denying this contention, Chief Justice Roll
held "that the devise is void, and that it is not in the power of
John the son, to make the election to take by descent or by purchase at his pleasure, but he must of necessity take the land as
the law directs, which is by descent . . . . " 31 Justice Bacon was
of the same view and held "that the heir doth here take by descent,
and not by purchase, for this the law says, and he cannot alter
it. . . . " 32 The rule being one of law and being tightly bound
to feudal concepts, it was applicable only to real property.33 At
least the writer has found no English decisions wherein it was
applied to personal property.
Ill.

REASONS FOR THE RULE IN ENGLAND

It seems obvious that this rule could not become so thoroughly
recognized as a part of the English common law unless some policy
dictated that it should be so. Many and varied reasons for the rule
have been given and no doubt different reasons existed at different
times. In Biederman v. Seymour,3-1 one of the last English cases
on the point, the Master of the Rolls, Lord Langdale, in looking
back over the three centuries during which the doctrine had flour29 Counden v. Clerk, Hob. 29, 80 Eng. Rep. 180 (1868); Preston v. Holmes, Sty. 148,
82 Eng. Rep. 601 (1648).
30 Sty. 148, 82 Eng. Rep. 601 (1648).
31 82 Eng. Rep. 601
32 Ibid.
33 The cases do not discuss this point directly, but all of the English cases found,
except one, do involve real property. In Swaine v. Burton, 15 Ves. Jr. 365, 33 Eng. Rep.
792 at 794 (1808), there was a devise of certain real property and a bequest of a leasehold
estate to trustees to convey to the heir of the testator. In that case Lord Eldon held that
the rule did not apply to eith~ the real property or the personal property, but in so doing
made the following observation: "This is, not merely a devise of a freehold ·estate, but a
disposition of leasehold, freehold, and copyhold lands. There is no doubt, that the leasehold estate in equity would be taken by them [the heirs], as purchasers."
34 3 Beav. 368, 49 Eng. Rep. 144 (1840).
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ished, rather well summarized most of the reasons which had been
advanced when he said:
"By whatever may be the origin of the rule, which gives
to the heir by descent, that which the testator has intended
to devise; whether the rule be derived from the supposed
application of a principle that a man shall not have by gift
that which is his own without gift, as some have supposed;
or whether the rule be adopted for the benefit of third persons, as of the lord for the preservation of tenure, or of creditors for the payment of their debts; or simply as Mr. Justice
Bayley said in Chaplin v. Leroux, because it is convenient
that the property should be assets in the hands of the heir;
there seems to be no reason, why, as against the heir, the rule
should be extended further than the principle requires."35
The first reason advanced by Lord Langdale that "a man
shall not have by gift that which is his own without a gift" is
intriguing and, to the writer at least, is a rather legalistic argument. Yet, strange as it may seem, we find, in essence, this same
reason advanced in support of the position of the Restatement
of Property relating to the exercise of a power of appointment in
favor of a taker in default,36 which is a problem bearing a close
similarity to the one being discussed.
In view of the position of the Restatement that the wills branch
of the worthier title doctrine is dead,37 and what appears by
analogy to be .a contrary position on the exercise of a power of
appointment in favor of a taker in default, a brief comparison
of the two problems seems worthwhile.
The analogous problem on powers is this: if a donee of a
power of appointment exercises his power in favor of the person
named by the donor as a taker in default, does the appointee take
by appointment, or does he take in default of appointment? Subject to certain qualifications, the Restatement view is that he takes
in default of appointment.38 Or, to put it another way, he takes
as if no appointment had been made. In support of this position
Professor Casner has argued, "it seems curious to say that words
of appointment can give to the taker in default that which he
35 49

Eng. Rep. 144 at 145.
Amendments to Restatement, Proposed Final Draft No. 3-Property, p. 89 [Proposed Amendments submitted by the Reporters and Advisers to the Council Meeting and
to the Annual Meeting, June 1947].
37 PROPERTY REsrATEMENT §314, comment on subsection (2) (1940).
38 Id., §369.
36
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already has, subject only to defeasance by appointment to another,
which never occurs."39 To the writer, it would seem that this
argument is in essence the identical argument advanced by Lord
Langdale in support of the rule under discussion.
Professors Powell and Simes, on the other hand, have
countered, saying that the "taker in default who takes because a
power is found not to have been exercised takes by choice of the
donee just as truly as does an appointee selected by the donee." 40
Their argument seems sound. Furthermore, its reasoning is
equally appropriate to rebut the legalistic argument set forth by
Lord Langdale in support of the worthier title doctrine.
The two other reasons advanced by Lord Langdale for the
rule are on a much sounder footing. Indeed, it seems that the
real reason for the origin of the doctrine lies in the tenurial
relationship. 41 When the feudal society flourished, the feudal
incidents in favor of the lord were of considerable importance.
These were due the lord only if the tenant were in by descent
and not by purchase. That this was perhaps the chief reason for
the rule is recognized by the commissioners who were appointed
to inquire into the real property law of England. In their report
they said, "Various reasons are assigned for these rules; one is the
greater advantage to which lords of manors were formerly entitled,
where their tenants acquired their estates by descent...." 42
IV.

How

THE RuLE

WAS

APPLIED

It was not difficult for the English common law judges to state
the rule under discussion, for it was an established principle of
the common law. Furthermore, no apparent difficulty was experienced in applying the rule where the limitation was in form
to the "heirs" of the testator. But the courts were troubled and
39 Amendments to Restatement, Proposed Final Draft No. 3-Property, p. 89 [Proposed Amendments submitted by the Reporters and Advisers to the Council Meeting and
to the Annual Meeting, June 1947].
40 Ibid.
41 "This rule, that the devisee shall be in of the elder title, viz. by descent, has been
said by some to have been adopted in favour of the heir, that he might be in of his better
title, and, thereby, toll an entry, or have a warranty. But if that were the case, he would
be intitled to an election to take either under the will or under the devise, as might be
most for his advantage; but that he cannot do. The rule seems rather to have been adopted
in favour of third persons, viz. of the lord, for the preservation of the tenure, (which was
a valuable thing before the statute of Malbridge,) and of creditors for the preservation of
their debts." POWELL, DEVISES 430 (1806). See also Morris, "Inter Vivos Branch of Worthier
Title Doctrine," 2- OKLA. L. REV. 131 at 138-139 (1949).
42 FOURTII REPORT MADE To HIS MAJESTY BY TIIE COMMISSIONERS, APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO TIIE LAW OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY 74 (1833).
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encountered grave difficulty in determining when the rule applied
where the devise was not in form to the testator's heirs, but instead was to a named person or persons.
A.

A Devise to a Single Individual

A devise to an individual by name who was the heir at law
of the testator was the typical situation in which we find the rule
applied. For example, here there was no question under the
rule of primogeniture but that a devise to the eldest son constituted a devise to the heir. The devise was, therefore, void if all
the other requirements of the rule were satisfied.43 Likewise, if
the testator's sole heir were his daughter, 44 or granddaughter,4 5
or grandson,46 or any other single individual, a devise to such an
individual was void. The rule was, therefore, sometimes oversimplified and it was stated that "a devise to the heir is void." 47
B.

A Devise to Several Persons Who Are the Heir

Sometimes a situation arose in which it was said that several
persons inherited land as coparceners from the ancestor if he died
intestate. This was true if he left only daughters, or by particular
custom all males sometimes inherited in equal degree:18 The
question, therefore, naturally arose as to whether the rule applied
to a devise to several individuals who constituted the heir. For
example, suppose T died leaving only three daughters, A, B, and
C, as his only descendants. He devised to th~m, by name, all his
land. There was no question but that A, B, and C "put together
make but one heir, and have but one estate among them." 49
Hence, this was a devise to the heir. However, since under the will
they took as joint tenants and not as coparceners, it was said the
16 supra.
13 supra.
45 Note 14 supra.
46 Note 15 supra.
47 Reile's Abr. 626 (1668).
48 "An estate held in coparcenary is where lands of inheritance descend from the
ancestor to two or more persons. It arises by common law or particular custom. By
common law: as where a person seised in fee-simple or in fee tail dies, and his next heirs
are two or more females, his daughters, sisters, aunts, cousins, or their representatives; in
this case they shall all inherit, as will be more fully shown when we treat of descents
hereafter; and those co-heirs are then called coparceners; or, for brevity, parceners only.
(q) Parceners by particular custom are where lands descend, as in gavelkind, to all the
males in equal degree, as sons, brothers, uncles, &:c. (r) And in either of these cases, all
the parceners put together make but one heir, and have but one estate among them. (s)"
2 BLACKST. COMM. 187.
49lbid.
43 Note
44 Note
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quality of the estate under the devise was different from the
quality of the estate by descent, and the rule was held not to
apply. 50 This was also true if the devise were to A, B, and C as
tenants in common, since by descent they would have taken as
coparceners.51 These decisions, of course, had the effect of decidedly limiting the application of the doctrine, for here, even though
the devise was to the heir, the quality of the estate was not the same
and hence the devise was not void. Yet, admittedly, if the heir
had been but one person, the devise would have been void. The
only difference in the two situations was that in one instance the
heir was one person; in the second situation, the heir was several
persons.
This problem apparently distressed Coke, then attorney general, who put the problem to the court of the King's Bench,52
for it is said that "Coke, the Queen's attorney, demanded of the
court their opinion in this case. A man having two daughters,
being his heirs, deviseth his land to them and their heirs, and
dies; whether they shall take as jointenants by the devise, or as
coparceners by consent?-and all the Justices held clearly, that
they shall have it as jointenants, for the devise giveth it them in
another degree than the common law would have given it them,
and for the benefit of the survivorship between them." 53
C.

A Devise to One of Several Who Together Constitute
the Heir

Suppose a man dies feaving as his sole and only heirs at law
two daughters. He devises all his land to one. Is such a devise
within the rule? This question was decided in Reading v. Rawsterne.54 In that case, the testator had two daughters, B and C.
B predeceased the testator, leaving a son, D, to whom the testator
devised his land. The question to be decided was whether D took
one half by descent and one half by purchase, or all land by purchase. The court held "that D took the whole by purchase. For
though where the same estate is devised to the heir in quantity
and quality, as he would have taken by descent if there had been
50 Anonymous, Owen 65, 74 Eng. Rep. 903 (1594). See also Anonymous, Cro. Eliz. 431,
78 Eng. Rep. 671 (1595); Anonymous, Gouldsborough 141, 75 Eng. Rep. 1051 (1601). See
also Part V-B.
51 Bear's Case, 1 Leo. 112, 74 Eng. Rep. 105 (1558).
52 6 CRUISE, REAL PROPER.TY 153 (1850).
53 Anonymous, Cro. Eliz. 431, 78 Eng. Rep. 671 at 671 (1595).
54 2 Ld. Raym. 829, 92 Eng. Rep. 54 (1703). See also 91 Eng. Rep. 214 and 92 Eng.
Rep. 994 Ior other reports of the same case.
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no devise; the devise would be void, and such heir will take by
descent, . . . yet in this case the devise was not to the heir, for
one of the daughters, and consequently her representative, is not
heir alone, but D. and C. were heir to the devisor, Co. Lit. 163 b.
If a man plead a descent uni filiae et cohaeredi, it will be ill.
Besides, if the Court hold that D. took a moiety by descent, they
ought to hold consequently, that the devise as to the moiety was
void, and then the said moiety ought to descend to D. and B. as
heirs to A. [testator] and consequently D. had but three fourths of
the lands, where they were entirely devised to him. And therefore this case is not within the reason of the cases cited; but of
necessity it must be adjudged, that D. took the whole by purchase."55
This decision emphasizes the strict limits within which the
wills branch applied. It was not applied for the simple reason
that the devise "was not to the heir," since one of two coparceners
"is not heir alone." In other words, this will did not come within
the scope of the doctrine.
This case, however, immediately suggests another question.
Suppose A dies leaving as his sole heir his son. He devises to his
son an undivided one-half interest in a tract of land. In a subsequent paragraph of his will he devises an undivided one-half
interest in the same tract to a stranger. Does the rule apply, or
does the son take by purchase? The writer has found no English
decision on the point; however, Mr. Fearne has expressed the view
that the rule would apply.56
55 92 Eng. Rep. 54.
56 "In an opinion of

Mr. Feame, which has been printed, he says, that a devise to
the heir and another, as tenants in common, will not prevent the heir's taking his moiety
by descent. For suppose a testator devises a moiety, or any other undivided share of his
real estate, to a stranger, making no disposition of all the Temaining undivided share,
such remaining share would of course descend to his heir at law, and he must hold it in
common with the devisee of the undivided share devised. It was clear, therefore that an
heir might take by descent, as tenant in common with a devisee, an undivided part of the
estate of which his ancestor was solely seised: and it appeared to be immaterial whether
the share he so takes is expressly devised to him, or left unnoticed by the will: for if
expressly devised, he takes it in common; and if not noticed, he takes in the same manner;
and a devise to two or more as tenants in common is in effect a devise of one undivided
part to one, and of another undivided part to the other. So that under such a devise to
an heir and a stranger as tenants in common, the heir takes as if one undivided moiety
were devised to the stranger, and the residue to himself, that is in the same manner as
if no disposition at all of such residue had been expressed in the will, in which case he
would have taken by descent; and therefore the same estate being devised to him in such
residue, as he would have taken by descent; the general rule respecting devises to an heir
extends to it." 6 CRUISE, REAL PROPERTY 154, citing Fearne's Opin. 128.
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WHAT Is THE SAME ESTATE OR INTEREST

It has been said that "where the heir takes the same estate in
the nature and quality which the law would give him, he takes
by descent,"57 but if "the estate given is different in its quality
from the estate which would have descended, there the heir shall
take by devise.... " 58 And in Doe v. Timins,5 9 the court observed,
"In Chaplin v. Leroux this Court thought the heir took by descent; the quantity and quality of estate being the same, whether
he took by descent or devise; the quantity because in both cases
the heir took a fee, and the quality because he took in severalty."
The statement of the court in Doe v. Timins lays down a
double standard; both quantity and quality of estate must be the
same. Therefore, we should give some consideration to these
two concepts.

A.

The English Concept of Quantity

The quantity aspect of the rule has been the source of much
litigation in the United States. In fact, the concept of "quantity"
by some American courts is entirely different from the English
concept and therein lies the reason why the rule has been found
not to apply in many cases in the United States. "Quantity" to
many American courts has meant the amount or proportion or
value of the estate devised. Suppose a testator devises an undivided
one-half interest in land in fee to one of his sons. Suppose further
that if the testator had died intestate, his son, as one of his heirs,
would have taken but an undivided one-fourth interest in fee.
On the facts, some American courts have b_een quick to say that
the "quantity" of the estate devised is not the same; hence, the
son takes by devise. 60
The English concept of quantity did not pertain to amount,
value, or proportion. Rather, "quantity" was a term defining the
nature of the estate devised; that is, quantity to the English judge
had reference to whether the heir took a fee simple, a fee tail, or
a life estate. This was pointed out in Chaplin v. Leroux61 and in
Doe v. Timins,62 where the court observed that the quantity of
the estate was the same "because in both cases the heir took a fee.''
57 Chaplin v. Leroux, 5 M. &: S. 14, 105 Eng. Rep. 957
58 Scott v. Scott, 1 Eden 458, 28 Eng. Rep. 762 (1759).
59 1 B. &: Ald. 531,
60 For a discussion

at 959 (1816).

106 Eng. Rep. 195 at 201 (1818). Emphasis added.
of the cases in the United States on this point, see Part XI-A infra.
615 M. &: S. 14, 105 Eng. Rep. 957 (1816).
621 B. &: Ald. 531, 106 Eng. Rep. 195 (1818).
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It should be said, however, that, except in cases involving a
charge or a condition,63 there was seldom any occasion in English
law for the courts to consider whether a difference in amount,
proportion, or value would so change the estate devised as to prevent the application of the rule. Since the rule applied only where
one heir at law was involved, no question concerning amount,
proportion, or value could ever arise except in the type of situation pointed out by Mr. Fearne. 64 We cannot say, therefore, that
the English decisions are definitive on this precise problem.65
B.

The English Concept of Quality

Since the rule did not apply unless the quality of the estate
or the interest devised was precisely the same as that which the
heir would have taken by descent, the question frequently arose:
what kind of a limitation in a will so changes the quality as to
prevent the application of the rule?
I. The Effect of a Charge. Suppose land is devised to the
testator's heir at law subject to a payment of a thousand dollars
by the heir to his younger brother. Does such a charge impressed
upon the land change the quality so as to take such a devise out
from under the rule? The English courts had said no, 66 although
there is one early case to the contrary.67 In other words, the
English view was that a charge did not prevent the heir from
taking by descent "for the tenure is not altered." 68
2. The Effect of an Executory Interest. Suppose land is devised to A, the testator's sole heir at law in fee, but if he die under
the age of twenty-one without living issue to B in fee. Does the
executory interest over in favor of B change the quality of the
fee simple estate devised to A so as to prevent the application of
the rule? Or suppose land were devised to the testator's wife until
63 For a discussion of cases involving charges and conditions, see Part
64 See Part IV-C supra.
65 The writer is not alone in the view that this rule applied only

V-B-1 and 2 infra.

in the case where
one person was the heir. For example, see 2 MINOR, INsrITtJTFS, 4th ed., 1045 (1892). For a
contrary view, however, see Harper and Heckel, "Doctrine of Worthier Title," 24 ILL. L.
REv. 6'2/1 at 648 (1930).
66 Clerk v. Smith, 1 Salk. 242, 91 Eng. Rep. 214 (1698); Emerson v. Inchbird, 1 Ld.
Raym. 728, 91 Eng. Rep. 1386 (1702); Allam v. Heber, 2 Strange 1'2/10, 93 Eng. Rep. 1174
(1748); Hurst v. Earl of Winchelsea, 2 Burr. 879, 97 Eng. Rep. 611 (1759); Biederman v.
Seymour, 3 Beav. 368, 49 Eng. Rep. 144 (1840). Also see dictum in Scott v. Scott, 1 Eden
458, 28 Eng. Rep. 762 (1759) and Manbridge v. Plummer, 2 My. &: K. 93, 39 Eng. Rep.
879 (1833).
67 Brittam v. Charnock, 2 Mod.·286, 86 Eng. Rep. 1076 (1677).
68 Allam v. Heber, 2 Strange 1'2/10, 93 Eng. Rep. 1174 (1748).
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the son and heir attains twenty-four years of age and then to him
in fee. Was the quality of the estate devised to the heir the same
as he would have taken if there had been no devise to him?
These were troublesome problems and the early decisions were
in conflict.69 Scott v. Scott70 was the case chiefly relied on as holding that a gift over so changed the nature of the estate devised
to the heir as to make the rule inapplicable. In that case, the
testator devised certain land to his eldest son, Henry, in fee, but
should he die without issue under twenty-one, then over. A question arose with respect to the marshaling of assets, and it was
urged that the devise to Henry was void, and that the land should
be treated as intestate property. The court, however, refused to
apply the rule and held that the heir "took a different estate from
what he would have had by descent." 71
This case was nevertheless overruled in Doe v. Timins,72 and
the weight of authority is clearly contrary to Scott v. Scott.73 The
latest English judicial utterances on the subject came in Manbridge v. Plummer,7 4 where it was said, "it has always been the
established doctrine, that a charge upon an estate devised to the
heir does not break the descent; how then will a condition operate?
The charge partially affects the devise, the condition wholly affects
it; and it being determined that a charge, which carries off a part,
does not break the descent, neither does a condition, which in a
particular event would carry off the whole, break the descent." 75
3. The Effect of a Trust. It seems to _have been held in at
least two English cases that a devise of land to trustees, with directions to convey to a person who is heir at law of the testator, breaks
the descent and prevents the application of the rule.'. 6 In Swaine
69 See Hinde v. Lyon, 2 Dyer 124a, 73 Eng. Rep. 271 (1555), and Hainsworth v. Pretty,
Cro. Eliz. 919, 78 Eng. Rep. 1140 (1602), which hold an executory interest does not prevent
the application of the rule. Contra, Gilpins Case, Cro. Car. 161, 79 Eng. Rep. 740 (1629).
70 1 Eden 458, 28 Eng. Rep. 762 (1759).
71 28 Eng. Rep. 762 at 764.
72 1 B. &: Aid. 530, 10 Eng. Rep. 195 (1818). In 6 CRUISE, REAL PROPERTY 153 (1850) it
is said that Scott v. Scott, I Eden 458, 28 Eng. Rep. 762 (1759), was "materially shaken, if
not overruled."
73 Hainsworth v. Pretty, Cro. Eliz. 919, 78 Eng. Rep. 1140 (1602); Chaplin v. Leroux,
5 M. &: S. 14, 105 Eng. Rep. 957 (1816). See also Hedger v. Rowe, 3 Lev. 127, 83 Eng. Rep.
612 (1682).
,74 2 My. &: K. 93, 39 Eng. Rep. 879 (1833).
75 39 Eng. Rep. 879 at 881.
76 Swaine v. Burton, 15 Ves. Jr. 365, 33 Eng. Rep. 792 (1808); Davis v. Kirk, 2 K. &: J.
391, 69 Eng. Rep. 834 (1856) .. In Davis v. Kirk, a testator devised land to trustees to pay
the income therefrom to W for life and at her death to convey "unto such person as
should answer the description of his heir at law." The.court held the heir at law took by
purchase and said: "The expression 'heir at law' is somewhat strong; but, independently
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v. Burton~77 the testatrix devised real and personal property in
trust to pay the income to Joseph Welch for life, and after his
death the trustees were to convey all of such property which had
not been sold for the payment of debts to "the heir or heirs at
law of her (testatrix') cousin William Cockell." William Cockell
left five women as his heirs at law. By unusual circumstances
these same five women were also the heirs at law of the testatrix.
Thus, in effect, upon the death of Joseph Welch, the life tenant,
the trustees were to convey to the testatrix' heirs at law. By the
common law these women, if they took under the will, took as
joint tenants with the right of survivorship, whereas, if they took
by descent they took as coparceners. This became important, for
one of the five died and her eldest son claimed a one-fifth part
of the land. The other four women claimed that the land had
been acquired by the five as joint tenants and that they as the
survivors were entitled to it all. So the question was squarely
raised as to whether they acquired the land as joint tenants by
purchase or as coparceners by descent. In holding that they acquired the land by purchase, Lord Chancellor Eldon said, "the
effect of this devise is to break the descent; vesting the estates in
the trustees; and directing them to convey to the persons described as purchasers. . . . The devise also is, not to these heirs,
but to trustees; and by that devise the descent is broken." 78
It should be noted, however, that in Doe v. Timins79 there
was a devise of land in trust for .the testator's grandson and heir
at law until he attained twenty-one, and if he does not attain
twenty-one then over in trust to three nieces. The trust aspect
of this case was not discussed and the court held the grandson
took by descent. Perhaps the court was so intent on distinguishing and overruling Scott v. Scott that no consideration was given
to this point.
of that, the fact of the testator having divested the inheritable quality of the estate by
breaking the descent entirely, and giving the estate to trustees, and leaving them to find
out the heir, has put them under an obligation to look upon the heir as a persona
designata, and they cannot regard the inheritable quality of the estate, but they must find
out the person who answers the description of heir at law of the testator." 69 Eng. Rep.
834 at 835. This case is difficult to explain since it came down after the wills branch of
the doctrine had been abolished by statute in England. That fact was never mentioned
though it would appear to have been a complete answer, unless it was felt that the
statute was incomplete and did not cover this type of a devise.
15 Ves. Jr. 365, 33 Eng. Rep. 792 (1808).
33 Eng. Rep. 792 at 794. See comment on this case in note to Scott v. Scott, 28 Eng.
Rep. 762 at 764.
79 1 B. & Ald. 530, 106 Eng. Rep. 195 (1818).
77
78

466

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 54

4. The Effect of a Future Interest; the Effect of a Power of
Sale. In the early case of Preston v. H olmes8° a curious argument
was made. The testator devised land to his wife for life and, at
her death, to his eldest son in fee. It was argued "that the son
takes by purchase, and not by descent: for the devise is not to the
son in present, but after the death of the testator's wife, and if he
had the lands by descent, he should have them presently." In
other words, counsel argued that the remainder to the heir was a
future interest, and that if there had been no will he would have
taken a possessory estate. The court, of course, overruled this
contention. Indeed, many of the cases already discussed involved
future interests, and the English courts, so far as the 1VTiter has
been able to determine, have never refused to apply the rule
because a future interest rather than a possessory estate was involved. However, this point should be kept in mind, for it arises
again in connection with the American decisions. 81
Turning now to the question of a power of sale, we find this
matter decided in Doe v. Timins. 82 Here the testator devised
land in trust for his grandson, who was his heir at law, until he
should attain twenty-one, and if he should not attain twenty-one,
then over. The trustee also had a power of sale. The question
there presented was "does this power of distress and sale, and the
executory devise over, break the descent?"83 The court concluded
that it did not; the grandson took by descent. With the divestiture charact~r of a power and th~ divestiture character of an executory interest being as similar and analogous as they are, it is difficult to see how the court could have reached any other conclusion.
VI.

THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE RULE

The legal consequences of the rule were of considerable magnitude while it obtained in England. At the English common law
the course of descent of land was traced to the last purchaser; it,
therefore, made a difference in many cases whether a devise to an
heir gave him an interest by purchase or whether it was void and
he took by descent. 84 Creditors of decedents were likewise vitally
affected, for if the decedent validly disposed of his land by will
80Sty. 149, 82 Eng. Rep. 601 (1648).
81 See Part XI·D infra.
82 I B. &: Aid. 530, 106 Eng. Rep. 195 (1818).
83 106 Eng. Rep. 195 at 201.
84 Clerk v. Smith, I Salk. 242, 91 Eng. Rep. 214 (1698); Smith v. Triggs, I Strange 487,
93 Eng. Rep. 651 (1721); Hurst v. Earl of Winchelsea, 2 Burr. 879, 97 Eng. Rep. 611
(1759); Manbridge v. Plummer, 2 My. &: K. 93, 39 Eng. Rep. 879 (1833).
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to his heir, such land could not be reached by the decedent's creditors, whereas if the devise were void, it could be so reached.85
Furthermore, the existence of the rule sometimes affected the
rights of parties when marshaling of assets was involved.86
VII.

STATUTORY ABOLITION OF THE RULE

In 1833 both the inter vivas and wills branches of the worthier
title doctrine were abolished in England by statute.87 As a doctrine forming an integral part of the English common law and
applied as a rule of policy, it had become purposeless. The reasons
giving rise to its judicial birth were no more. 88 Its existence caused
much litigation and defeated otherwise legitimate intention. Hence
the recommendation that it be abolished was well received, and
the statute abrogating the entire doctrine resulted.89
It is interesting to note, however, that nearly seventy years
later a case arose in which an interpretation of the abrogating
statute was drawn into question and a most curious problem presented itself for decision. It will be remembered that a devise
85 Hinde v. Lyon, 2 Dyer 124a, 73 Eng. Rep. 271 (1555); Bashpool's Case, 2 Leo. 101,
74 Eng. Rep. 392 (1585); Bear's Case, 1 Leo. 112, 74 Eng. Rep. 105 (1589); Gilpin's Case,
Cro. Eliz. 161, 79 Eng. Rep. 740 (1629); Brittam v. Charnock, 2 Mod. 286, 86 Eng. Rep.
1076 (1677); Emerson v. Inchbird, 1 Ld. Raym. 728, 91 Eng. Rep. 1386 (1702); Allam v.
Heber, 2 Strange 1270, 93 Eng. Rep. 1174 (1748).
86 Scott v. Scott, 1 Eden 458, 28 Eng. Rep. 762 (1759); Strickland v. Strickland, 10
Sim. 374, 59 Eng. Rep. 659 (1839); Biederman v. Seymour, 3 Beav. 368, 49 Eng. Rep. 144
(1840). In Manbridge v. Plummer, 2 My. &: K. 93, 39 Eng. Rep. 879 (1833), the court distinguishes Scott v. Scott, supra, because it principally involved a marshaling of assets.
87 Stat. 3 and 4 Wm. 4, c. 106, §3 (1833). That portion of the statute abolishing the
wills branch of the doctrine provides as follows: "When any land shall have been devised,
by any Testator who shall die after the Thirty-fust day of December One thousand and
eight hundred and thirty-three, to the Heir or to the Person who shall be the Heir of
such Testator, such Heir shall be considered to have acquired the Land as a Devisee, and
not by Descent. •••"
88 For the historical reason for the rule see Part m supra.
89 "The Rule appears to us to be objectionable, because it creates several intrica,te
distinctions, and has occasioned litigation among different classes of representatives.
Where there is any difference between the estate which would pass by the devise, and the
estate which the Heir would take by descent, he takes by force of the devise, and in some
cases, where the devise is contingent or executory, it is not settled in which of the two
characters the Heir will be entitled. In all cases the estate is considered to pass by the
Will, for the purpose of exonerating the Heir from the liability he would otherwise be
subject to, of being primarily liable for the whole of the specialty debts of the Testator,
although it would not be held to pass by the Will, for the purpose of exonerating the
Heir from such debts as before the passing of the late Statute could not be recovered from
the Devisee. We also think, that where the Testator expressly devises an estate, his intention may be inferred to be that the devise should take effect.
"We consider, therefore, that the Rule which makes the devise void in such cases,
should be abolished, and that the Heir should take by virtue of the devise." 4 FoURTII
REPORT MADE TO His MAJESTY BY TIIE COMMISSIONERS, APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO THE
LAW OF ENGLAND REsPECTING REAL PROPERTY 74 {1833).
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in form to "my heirs" or "my right heirs" was accorded slightly
different treatment by the English courts than was a devise to A,
who turned out to be the testator's heir at law.90 That is to say,
when the testator employed the words "heirs" or "right heirs"
they were treated as words of limitation just as they were when
the rule in Shelley's Case was involved or when the inter vivos
branch of the worthier title doctrine was involved. This being
true, the language of the statute abrogating the worthier title
doctrine became most important, for the statute purported to
abolish the rule only when there was a devise "To the Heir or to
the Person who shall be the Heir of such Testator. . . ." 91
Nothing was said about a devise to the "heirs" or "right heirs"
of the testator. It was, therefore, the considered judgment of Mr.
Hayes that "the legal import of a limitation by will to the heirs
or right heirs generally, (as distinguished from a devise to the
individual heir) of the testator, which does not appear to be
altered by the act is equivalent to a declaration of intestacy as
regards the estate to which it applies."92
Mr. Hayes' argument was urged upon the court in Owen v.
Gibbons.93 The court, as a matter of construction, held that the
statute applied even though the form of the limitation was to the
testator's "own right heirs." Though this construction was at
variance with Mr. Hayes' view, his construction would have resulted in only a partial abrogation of the doctrine, and it would
seem that since the parliament in the same statute had expressly
abrogated the rule as to inter vivos gifts which were in form to the
"heirs" of a grantor, it surely intended a like result when the gift
by way of a devise was to the "heirs" or "right heirs" of the testator. It is not difficult, therefore, to see how the court, as a
matter of construction, arrived at its decision.
VIII.

THE DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES

In 1813, while speaking for the United States Supreme Court,
Justice Story said: "It is true that the general rule is, that an heir
shall not take by devise, when he may take the same estate in
the land by descent." 94 A few years later, when writing his Commentaries, Chancellor Kent stated: "A devise to the heir at law
90 See Part 11-B supra.
91 See note 87 for the terms of the statute.
92 1 HAYES, INTRODUCTION TO CONVEYANCING,

5th ed., !HS (1840).
(1902] 1 Ch. 636.
94 Barnitz's Lessee v. Robert Casey, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 456 (1813).
93
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is void, if it gives precisely the same estate that the heir would
take by descent if the particular devise to him was omitted out
of the will. The title by descent has, in that case, precedence to
the title by devise." 95
Does the rule of law stated by these distinguished jurists exist
in the United States today? Dean Pound has observed that "fifty
years is a long life for a rule, that is a legal precept that attaches
a definite detailed legal consequence to a definite detailed state
of facts.'' 96 Holmes made a similar observation.97 Since the wills
branch of the worthier title doctrine is precisely that kind of rule,
one might expect to find it extinct after nearly 150 years of operation. Some authorities, notably the Restatement, have asserted
that the rule alluded to by Justice Story and Chancellor Kent is
no longer the law in the United States.98
On the other hand, equally eminent authorities have been
less dogmatic. Professor Simes is one who had adopted a more
cautious and, it is submitted, a more realistic approach. He states:
"At one time it was important to know whether land passed by
devise or descent. But today it is impossible to see why it should
make any difference whether a person takes the land of a decedent
by devise or descent. Hence, although there is some authority to
the contrary, the better view is that in so far as the worthier [title]
doctrine is applicable to wills, it is obsolete." 99
Professor Powell has likewise declined to go along completely
with the categoric position of the Restatement. He has stated,
"Modern American Law has progressively eliminated these significances of the wills branch of this rule. Consequently, the Restatement of the Law of Property took the position that this branch of
the rule is no longer a part of American law. An occasional decision nevertheless bears the imprint of the obsolete rule.''100
Professor Casner has expressed the view that there is a "lack
of significance in modern times of the doctrine of worthier title
as applied to a devise to the testator's heirs."101 Writing at a
later date, however, he fully recognizes that the rule may still
95 4 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 5015.
96 Pound, "Survey of Conference Problems,"

14 UNIV. OF CrN. L. REv. 324 at 329

(1940).
97 See HOLMES, "The Path of the Law," COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
98 PROP.EltTY RESTATEMENT §314 (2) (1940).
991 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §4.19, p. 440 (1952).
100 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §381, p. 262 (1952).
1015 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §22.56, p. 414 (1952).

167 at 169 (1920).
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exist and he inferentially admonishes estate planners to beware
of its disruptive character.102
It goes without saying that there is virtual unanimity of opinion among the recognized authorities that the wills branch should
not be the law. But to say that the wills branch is not the law
goes a step further. It is the ·writer's view that the position of the
Restatement is absolutely sound and correct, unless there is considerable authority holding that different legal consequences do
in fact result by applying the wills branch. It would therefore
seem proper at the very outset to direct our attention to thatquestion. For unless different legal consequences do result, questions as to how the rule is applied, how many jurisdictions have
recognized it, and the like, are largely academic.
IX.

Do DIFFERENT LEGAL CONSEQUENCES REsuLT FROM
APPLYING THE WILLS BRANCH?

A.

The Course of Descent

There was a time when it was vitally important in tracing
the course of descent of land to ascertain whether it was acquired
by descent or purchase.103 Current legal thinking, however, is
very generally premised on the theory that the mode of acquisition of land is wholly unimportant with respect to its future devolution. One writer has said that the "problem has ceased to exist,
since even in the few states which retain the doctrine. of ancestral
estates, statutes uniformly include realty coming to the intestate
by devise or gift as well as by descent."104 While this statement is
no doubt accurate in a general sense, it is inaccurate in one important detail. This detail relates to the descent of property
owned by a minor who dies unmarried, under age, and without
issue. As to such a minor, statutes in several states provide that
if the property came to the decedent by inheritance~ then it descends to his surviving brothers and sisters or their issue, if any.
If it did not come to him by inheritance-or to put it another
way-if it came to him by purchase, it will devolve upon a surviving parent, if one survives.105
102 CAsNER, EsrATE PLANNING 196-197 (1953).
103 The English cases are numerous. For United

States cases see, for example, Donnelly
v. Turner, 60 Md. 81 (1883); Latrobe v. Carter, 83 Md. 279, 34 A. 472 (1896); Landic v.
Simms, 1 App. D.C. 507 (1893); University v. Holstead, ·4 N.C. 289 (1816); Yelverton v.
Yelverton, 192 N.C. 614, 135 S.E. 632 (1926).
104 Comment, 46 HAR.v. L. REv. 993 at 999 (1933).
105 The Michigan statute is typical of those which fall in this category. It provides
_as follows: " ••• and if the intestate shall leave no issue, husband or widow, his or her
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Statutes of this type exist in at ·1east fourteen jurisdictions.106
Although limited in their scope they do determine the course of
descent when the decedent dies (I) unmarried, (2) under age,
and (3) when the decedent acquired his interest by inheritance.101
With respect to the last requirement there is persuasive authority
that the words "by inheritance" used in these descent and distribution statutes have a well accepted technical meaning. The California Supreme Court in construing its statute made this observation:
"And this provision does not affect the question, unless
'the estate came to the deceased child . . . by inheritance
from such deceased parent.' Did the estate devised by the
will of James Donahue, the father of the intestate, come to
the latter by 'inheritance,' within the meaning of the statute.
We think not. We have no doubt that the term 'inheritance'
is used in the statute in its ordinary, well known signification.
An estate acquired by inheritance is one that has descended
to the heir, a~d been cast upon him by the single operation
of law. 'Descent or hereditary succession is the title whereby
a man, on the death of his ancestor, acquires his estate by
right of representation as his heir at law. An heir, therefore,
is he upon whom the law casts the estate immediately on the
death of the ancestor; and an estate so descending to the heir
is in law called the inlieritance.' (. . . 2 Black. Com. 241,
294, 373, 374.)
estate shall descend to the father and mother in equal shares, and if there be but 1 of the
parents living, then to the survivor alone; . • • Provided, however, That if such intestate
shall die under the age of 21 years and not having been married, all the estate that came
to such intestate by inheritance from a parent, which has not been lawfully disposed of,
shall descend to the other children and the issue of deceased children of the same parent,
if there be such children or issue, and if such persons are in the same degree of kindred
to said intestate they shall take equally, otherwise they shall take by right of representation.•• .'' Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §702.80. Italics added.
106 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (1949) §60-1-3-4; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1953) §§200,
225 and 227; Idaho Code (1948) §14-103; Me. Rev. Stat. (1954) c. 170, §1, subdiv. VII;
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §§67-1201, 91-401, 91-403; Nev. Comp. Laws (1949 Supp.)
§9882.297; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §§47-0121, 56-0101, 56-0104; Okla. Stat. (1951) §§60-331,
84-213; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §111.020; S.D. Code (1939) §§56.0101, 56.0104; Utah Code
Ann. (1953) §74-4-5; Wash. Rev. Code, §11.04.020; Wis. Stat. (1953) §237.01 (6).
In Wisconsin the statute herein cited applies only if the child dies unmarried, under
age and without surviving brothers or sisters, but with surviving issue of deceased brothers
or sisters. In such a 915e the "estate" which came to the child "by inheritance" from his
parent goes to the issue of deceased children of the same parent. But if the child dies
unmarried, under age and leaves surviving brothers or sisters of the same parent, then the
"estate" acquired by such child from his parent "by inheritance or by testamentary gift"
goes to his surviving brothers and sisters. See note 110 infra.
107 The California statute now uses the word "succession" instead of "inheritance.''
The Oregon statute uses the word "descent" in lieu of "inheritance."
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"The estate, in this instance, was not cast upon the deceased by operation of law, as the representative and heir
of his father, but was conferred upon him by devise. The
estate was acquired by purchase, in the technical sense of the
term, and not by descent. It did not come to him by inheritance, and should not,. therefore, have been distributed under
the seventh subdivision of section one, but under the third,
which gives the mother an equal share with the brothers and
sisters. " 108
The Michigan Supreme Court has taken the same view.100
Furthermore, based upon the Wisconsin and Minnesota statutes,
a strong argument can be made that the words "by inheritance"
do not include property acquired by devise. That is to say, the
statutes in these states demonstrate the type of language the legislature employs when it intends to include property which the
decedent may have acquired by will. These statutes are unequivocal in their language. The Minnesota statute provides as follows:
"If a minor die leaving no spouse nor issue surviving, all of his
estate that came to him by inheritance or will from his parent
shall descenq. and be distributed to the other children of the same
parent, if any... .''110
In view of the statutes in these fourteen jurisdictions, it becomes apparent that the course of descent may well depend upon
whether property is acquired by descent or purchase. Such being
the case, the wills branch takes on obvious significance. This fact
was pointed out in Cordon v. Gregg.111 There the Supreme Court
of Oregon was faced with these facts: the testator had devised
certain real and personal property in trust to be paid over to his
son when he arrived at age twenty-one. His son was the testator's
sole heir at law. Two months after the testator's death, his son
died, being seventeen years old, unmarried, and without issue.
108 Estate of Donahue, 36 Cal. 329 at 332 (1868). See also Larrabee v. Tracy, !19 Cal.
App. (2d) 593, 104 P. (2d) 61 (1940).
109 The words "by inheritance" were of particular significance in Jenks v. Trowbridge
Estate, 48 Mich. 94 (1882). In commenting on the technical meaning of these words, the
Supreme Court later, in referring to the opinion in the Jenks case, said: "It gave to the
words 'by inheritance' used in the statute their technical legal meaning, as having reference only to the descent of real estate." In re Dodge's Estate, 242 Mich. 156 at 159, 218
N.W. 798 (1928).
110 Minn. Stat. (1953) §525.16 (5). The Wisconsin statute speaks of "all the estate that
came to the deceased child by inheritance or by testamentary gift. •.•" Wis. Stat. (1953)
§237.0I (5). Italics added.
111164 Ore. 306, 97 P. (2d) 732, rehearing granted, IOI P. (2d) 414 (1940), noted in
20 ORE. L. R.Ev. 164 (1941).
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The son's heir at law was his mother, who was the divorced wife
of the testator. The Oregon descent and distribution statute provided as follows:
"3. If the intestate shall leave no lineal descendants,
neither husband, nor wife, nor father, such property shall
descend to his or her mother; . . .
"5. When any child shall die under the age of 21 years
and leave no husband nor wife nor children, any real estate
which descended to such child shall descend to the heirs of the
ancestor from which such real property descended the same
as if such child died before the death of such ancestor."
The wills branch was strongly urged to defeat the claim of the
testator's divorced wife. That is to say, counsel argued that the
devise by the testator to his heir at law came within the wills
branch and, therefore, he took by descent and not by purchase;
accordingly the land "descended to such child" as provided in
subdivision 5 of the statute.
On its first hearing the court expressly declined and refused
to apply the wills branch, although the precise reasons for its
refusal are not entirely clear. Nevertheless, the court held that
the word "descended" included real property devised by the will
and, therefore, held against the testator's divorced wife. On rehearing, however, the court reversed its former position and held the
wills branch fully applicable. In so doing the court made this
pertinent observation:
" . . . We are now convinced that the common-law rule
above referred to has not been changed or abrogated by the
statute and that such rule, although never heretofore announced in any decision of this court, we think is binding
upon the courts of this state like any other applicable common-law rule which has not been abrogated by statute. . . .
That rule is stated by Blackstone as follows: '. . . But if a
man, seised in fee, devises his whole estate to his heir at law,
so that the heir takes neither a greater nor a less estate by
the devise than he would have done without it, he shall be adjudged to take by descent, even though it be charged with
incumbrances; this being for the benefit of creditors and
others, who have demands on the estate of the ancestor. 1
Chitty, Bl. Comm., *242.' " 112
Under similar statutes the Supreme Courts of Massachusetts
and New Hampshire have clearly recognized that if the wills
112164 Ore. 306 at 316, 101 P. (2d) 414 (1940).
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branch is found to be applicable113 different legal consequences
will result.11 4 Thus the course of descent may well be affected in
those jurisdictions having statutes of the type herein discussed.

B.

The Rights of Creditors

Recent decisions unequivocally show that cr_editors' rights may
be determined by the application of the wills branch. This is
demonstrated by Rossiter v. Soper. 115 In that case the testatrix
devised land to her sister and husband in the exact shares they
would have taken as her heirs at law had she died intestate. Subsequent to the probate of her will, this land was sold through a
probate proceeding to pay some of the decedent's debts. A subsequent purchaser of an undivided interest in the land sought to
partition it and joined the decedent's husband as a defendant. To
defeat the partition suit and the probate sale proceedings, the
husband argued that the land was homestead and that he had
not waived his homestead nor consented in writing to the sale of
such interest.
The purchaser at the sale argued that his homestead interest
was extinguished because he failed to renounce the provisions
made for him in the will and that, failing to renounce, both he
and decedent's sister "became the owners of the property, under
the will, as tenants in common, subject to the debts of the
estate."116 Under Illinois law, if the spouse accepts the terms of
a will it constitutes a waiver of the homestead.11 7 In holding that
the husband had not waived his homestead the court said:
"It may be noted in this connection, that the will was void
and wholly inoperative. It devised to the surviving husband
and sister of the testatrix, who were her only heirs, the same
interests which they would take by descent had she died intestate. . . . They, therefore took under the statute by descent, and not under the will. . . . The fact that appellant
did not renounce the will can have no bearing whatever on
the issues in this case. . . . He took nothing under the will.
when the ,\Tills branch is applied, see Part XI infra.
(88 Mass. 171) (1863); M'Afee v. Gilmore, 4 N.H.
391 (1828), See also Hoover's Lessee v. Gregory, 18 Tenn. 444 (1837), where the wills
branch was applied with different legal consequences resulting as to the devolution of
property under the Tennessee descent and distribution statute. It should be noted that
the language of the statute in both Massachusetts and New Hampshire has been changed
since these cases were decided.
115 384 Ill. 47, 50 N.E. (2d) 701 (1943).
116 Id. at 49.
117 Stubblefield v. Howard, 348 Ill. 20, 180 N.E. 410 (1932).
113 For a discussion of how and
J.14 Sedglvick v. Minot, 6 Allen
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He was wholly unaffected by the will. His failure to renounce
the will did not affect his right of homestead. Having received nothing under the will, he received nothing in lieu of his
right of homestead. . . . There was nothing on which a finding could be based that he had waived his homestead by not
renouncing the will. " 118
It can thus be seen that the court was quick to use the wills
branch to put to rest the argument that the decedent's husband
had waived his homestead by electing to take under the will. If
the will was void so far as he was concerned, it was impossible for
him to waive his homestead by electing to accept its terms.119
Another point should not be overlooked. This case may be
determinative on the question of whether dower is barred. If the
dispositive provisions of a will are void because of the wills branch,
then presumably the will would not have the effect of barring
dower as provided by statute.120 In fact, the· court said that the
"surviving husband was also entitled to dower in the one-half
interest which descended to the sister of the deceased, under the
Descent Act in force at the time of her death." 121
Let us now tum to a second situation where the wills branch
may be significant in determining the rights of creditors. There
is a line of American cases which hold that a person may renounce
a devise in his favor even though by so doing he defeats the claims
of his creditors.122 Contrariwise, there is respectable authority that
an heir taking by descent is powerless to renounce and, therefore,
is in no position to place his assets beyond the reach of his creditors.123 That being the state of the law, it immediately becomes
important whether an heir at law takes by descent or purchase.
118 Rossiter v. Soper, 384 Ill. 47 at 49-50, 50 N.E. (2d) 701 (1943). Illinois has now
abolished the rule. See Part XII infra.
119 For a similar decision see Denny v. Denny, 123 Ind. 240, 23 N.E. 519 (1890).
120 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 3, §172, provides: "Any will, whether or not it contains any
provision for the benefit of the testator's surviving spouse, bars the right of the surviving
spouse to elect to take dower in all real estate of the testator, unless otherwise expressed
in the will or unless the will is renounced by the surviving spouse in the manner provided
in Section 17.''
121384 Ill. 47 at 49, 50 N.E. (2d) 701 (1943).
122 "The largest group of cases involving the right of an heir to renounce have been
decided with regard to the claims of creditors. As we have seen, it is well established that
a legatee may renounce a bequest in his favor. He may take such action even though he
is a bankrupt at the time and his renunciation defeats the just claims of his creditors."
Lauritzen, "Only God Can Make an Heir," 48 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 568 at 575 (1953), and
the cases cited. Cf. comment in MODEL PROBATE CODE §58, which states in part: "The
common law is not clear as to whether the devisee is able to defeat the rights of creditors
and taxing authorities."
128 Bostian v. Milens, 239 Mo. App. 555, 193 S.W. (2d) 797 (1946); In re Meyer's
Estate, 107 Cal. App. (2d) 799, 238 P. (2d) 597 (1951); annotation in 170 A.L.R. 435
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The importance of this problem was pointed out in the recent
case of McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig. 124 In that case a widow
devised land to her three sons, A, B, and C, who were her heirs
at law. A's creditor sought to attach A's interest in the land. To
thwart these efforts, A executed an instrument which he contended
was a renunciation of the will. The creditor countered by urging
the application of the wills branch, saying that A took by descent
and not by purchase. The court recognized the decisive nature of
this contention125 and clearly recognized that if "he takes by descent
he cannot renounce his interest so as to defeat his creditors."126
However, after a full discussion of the wills branch, the court
decided it should not be applied because the devise to A was not
of the same quality and quantity as he would have taken by
descent. 127 That is to say, since there was a legacy of $500 to a
sister, who was not an heir at law of the testatrix, and because of
the question concerning an advancement, A would not take under
the will an estate of the same value as if the testatrix had died
intestate, and hence the estate was of different quality and quantity.12s
.
But suppose there is no difference in quality and quantity and
hence no basis for finding that the doctrine cannot apply. Suppose T devises Blackacre to A, his son and only heir. The residue
of his estate, real and personal, he devises to B Charity. At T's
death, however, suppose Blackacre is his only asset so that by any
test A will necessarily receive an estate of the same quantity and
quality under the will as he would have received if his father had
died intestate. Thus if A is in by descent 'because of the wills branch
he cannot renounce and his creditors cari reach Blackacre. On
the other hand, if A takes as a devisee under the will and renounces, Blackacre would go to B Charity under the residuary
clause and A's creditors could not reach it. In other words, different legal consequences may result because of the application of
(1947). See also Lauritzen, "Only God Can Make an Heir," 48 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 568 at
575 (1953), where he says: "On the other hand, it is equally well settled that an heir can
not defeat his creditors in this way, because he has no power to renounce."

124 23 Tenn. App. 434, 134 S.W. (2d) 197 (1939), noted in 16 TENN. L. REv. 358
125 Id. at 442: "The first proposition to be considered is whether Lawrence

(1940).
Hirsig
held his interest in the estate, if any, as devisee or by inheritance, as the solution of this
question will greatly aid in determining whether he has any interest. If he holds the same
estate by devise that the law casts on him by descent, he is in by descent and not by devise.
Hoover's Lessee v. Gregory, 10 Yerg., 444." Italics added.
126 Id. at 442.
121 Id. at 443.
128 For a discussion as to the proper test in applying the doctrine, see Part XI-A and
B infra.

1956]

WoRTHIER TITLE DOCTRINE

477

the wills branch. Moreover, the argument in favor of applying
the wills branch in this kind of fact situation is an appealing one.
It operates to the benefit of a group of persons favored by the law.
Indeed, the fact that the rule operated in favor of creditors at the
common law is said to be one of the reasons for its early existence.129
A third situation of significance arises in Iowa where the wills
branch flourishes with vigor.130 The Iowa homestead statute purports to make a homestead which "descends to the issue" exempt
from antecedent debts of both the parent and the issue.131 The
clear import of the Iowa decisions is that an heir132 who takes by
purchase does not take the homestead free from his own antecedent debts, although such is the case if he takes by descent.133 In
other words, if the wills branch applies, an heir gets the protection
of the statute; if he takes under the will, he does not.
C.

Construction Problems

I. Conditions in Restraint of Marriage. From ancient times
conditions in wills in restraint of marriage have been looked upon
with disfavor.134 General conditions of this nature are said to be
contrary to public policy and void. That is to say, the condition
may be disregarded by the beneficiary in the will without fear of
losing the property so devised to him.
On the other hand, limitations have been treated differently.
For example, a devise to W so long as she remains unmarried has

129 See Part III supra.
130 See Part IX-D infra on the Iowa cases
131 Iowa Code (1954) §561.18: "Descent.

dealing with the lapse statute.
If there be no survivor, the homestead
descends to the issue of either husband or wife according to the rules of aescent, unless
otherwise directed by will." §561.19: "Exemption in hands of issue. Where the homestead
descends to the issue of either husband or wife the same shall be held by such issue
exempt from any antecedent debts of their parents or their own, e.'Ccept those of the
owner thereof contracted prior to its acquisition."
132 The "heir" must also be "issue."
133 Moninger & Ringland v. Ramsey, 48 Iowa 368 (1878); First Nat. Bank v. Willie,
115 Iowa 77, 87 N.W. 734 (1901); Rice v. Burkhart, 130 Iowa 520, 107 N.W. 308 (1906);
Luglan v. Lenning, 214 Iowa 439,239 N.W. 692 (1931). Curiously enough, notwithstanding
the language of the statute, it appears that the issue take the homestead free from the
ancestor's debts whether they take by descent or purchase. See In re Guthrie's Estate, 183
Iowa 851 at 858, 167 N.W. 604 (1918). "Whether such issue takes it free also from liability
for his own debts is made, by our decisions in Rice v. Burkhart •.. and Voris v. West ••. ,
to depend, first, upon the fact as to whether title passes by descent or purchase; and second, whether the ancestor did or did not leave a surviving spouse.•. :• Emphasis added.
See also Voris v. West, 180 Iowa 138, 162 N.W. 836 (1917).
134 Browder, "Conditions and Limitations in Restraint of Marriage," 39 MICH. L. R.Ev.
1288 (1941).
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not been viewed as a condition but rather as a limitation. If W
marries there is an automatic termination of her estate.
It can thus be seen that it becomes important in some cases
to det~rmine whether the devise is on "condition" or a "limitation." But this is most difficult to do and the cases give us no
answer, for words normally importing a condition have been
construed as a limitation -and vice versa.135 Furthermore, as Professor Browder has said, the "nadir of chaos is reached in those
cases where it has been held that the presence of a gift over turns
a condition into a limitation."136
It is at this "nadir of chaos" that the wills branch becomes significant. That is to say, the gift over converts the condition into
a limitation only if the gift over is valid. Suppose, therefore, that
T devises land to A in fee on the condition that she not marry
and if she marries, then "to the testator's heirs at law." Because
the gift over to the testator's heirs at law is said to be void under
the wills branch, it has been held that the "condition" will not
be converted to a "limitation."137
2. Failure of the Succeeding Interest. Turning now to a
second type of construction problem, suppose T devises the residue, consisting of land, to A in fee but if A die without leaving
any children surviving him, then over to B in fee. Assume B is
the sole and only heir at law of T. If the devise to B is void
because it violates the wills branch does it leave the fee absolute
in A even though he dies without surviving children? Or, does
it leave a possibility of reverter in B as the testator's sole heir at
law? No direct American authority has been found on this question with respect to the wills branch. There are American cases
on this point with respect to the inter vivas branch. In those
cases where the attempted executory interest was to the grantor's
"heirs at law" it has been held that the end limitation is void
in so far as it designates purchasers but there is a possibility of
reverter in the grantor.138 These cases certainly ought to be persuasive. If we assume that this same conclusion would also be
reached in the wills cases, then we might properly ask: does i~
make any difference whether the heir takes an executory interest
135 Id.

at 1315, and the cases cited.
at 1315.
137 Stilwell v. Knapper, 69 Ind. 558 (1880); Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169 (1810).
138 Coomes v. Frey, 141 Ky. 740, 133 S.W. 758 (1911); In re Brolasky's Estate, 302 Pa.
439, 153 A. 739 (1931). See also SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §27 (1951).
136 Id.
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under the will or a possibility of reverter by descent? The answer,
of course, is yes in those jurisdictions which hold possibilities
of reverter to be inalienable.139
A slight variation of the same problem arises in connection with
the rule against perpetuities. For example, suppose T devises his
residue, consisting of land, to X Church in fee but, if X Church
ever ceases to teach the Apostles' Creed as a part of its doctrine,
then to the testator's heirs at law. The orthodox view of this
limitation, leaving aside for the moment the effect of the wills
branch, would be that the executory interest to the heirs at law
is void because it violates the rule against perpetuities. In such a
situation it is almost universally held in the United States that
the failure of the succeeding interest leaves the prior interest absolute.140 In other words, X Church would have a fee simple absolute.
However, in Sears v. Russell141 it was suggested that if the
executory interest to the testator's heirs at law was void because
of the wills branch, this would prevent the application of the rule
against perpetuities. That is to say, it could be argued that the
wills branch renders the end limitation void only so far as designating the heirs as purchasers, thereby giving X Church a fee
simple determinable and thus leaving a possibility of reverter in
the testator's heirs at law. Accordingly, it can be seen that if by
applying the wills branch a court thereby precludes itself from
applying the rule against perpetuities, with the corresponding
result that the prior interest is rendered determinable instead of
absolute, the difference in legal consequences is obvious.
3. The Strange Case of Horton v. Cronley. If there is doubt
concerning the weird nature of some decisions involving the wills
branch, we need only consider the recent case of Horton v. Cronley.142 In that case the Oklahoma Supreme Court had before it
these facts: H and W had executed a joint will. It purported to
dispose of all property, real and personal, to the survivor "during
the remainder of their life." On the death of both H and W the
property was devised "one-half of estate equally to living brothers
and sisters" of H, and "one-half of estate equally to living brothers
139 Illinois, by statute, makes a possibility of reverter inalienable by deed or by will.
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 30, §37b. See also Pure Oil Co. v. Miller-McFarland Drilling Co.,
376 Ill. 486, 34 N.E. (2d) 854, 135 A.L.R. 567 (1941); North v. Graham, 235 Ill. 178, 85
N.E. 267 (1908).
140 SIMES, FtrrURE INTERESTS §96 (1951), and cases cited.
141 74 Mass. 86 (1857).
142 (Okla. 1953) 270 P. (2d) 306.
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and sisters" of W. H died first and the will was probated as his
will by W. In the petition for probate W asserted that she was the
"sole devisee and legatee, there being no children of their marriage, and that all of the property of the estate was acquired during
their married life by their joint industry and, therefore, she became the sole owner .thereof. " 143 Pursuant to her petition the
county court distributed all the property to her. Thereafter W
died devising all her property to her brothers and sisters. H's
brothers and sisters filed suit to establish title to one-half of the
assets in her estate.
It was argued that by probating H's will and by her conduct
with respect thereto W had elected to take under the will rather
than as a forced heir. In rejecting this contention, the court said:
"Under the Worthier Title Doctrine it must be presumed
that Henrietta took as a forced heir, rather than under the
will. However, plaintiffs contend that Henrietta took under
the will and therefore asserts that she and the defendants are
estopped from contending that she could revoke the conjoint
will. The fallacy of this position is demonstrated by the language of the will itself, as under the will she could only receive
a life estate. If she took under the will, the decree would have
vested in her a life estate only, but, as we have seen, the decree vested in her a full fee simple title. If Henrietta took
under the will as the sole legatee, then it follows that under
subdivision 3 of the will that one-half of the estate must go
to the living brothers and sisters of Ben and Henrietta, has
no application. [sic] The law presumes that Henrietta took
the Worthier Title which, under the law of succession, she
was entitled to. She received no benefit under the conjoint
will which at most could have given her a life estate. $he
elected to exercise her statutory right and took a fee simple
title under the laws of succession."144
This writer does not pretend to know what the court meant.
The opinion is directly contrary to the normal approach. Frequently courts go far in seeking reasons not to apply the wills
branch. Here the reverse is true. It is believed, therefore, that
this case cannot be squared with any orthodox concept of the
wills branch.145 It would seem that the court is holding that W
took as a forced heir by descent against the will, "rather than
under the will;" and to buttress that position the court somehow
143 Id. at 308.
144 Id. at 313.
145 See the dissenting

opinion by Williams, J., ibid.
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relies on the worthier title doctrine. This decision is especially
difficult to understand in view of the court's refusal to apply the
wills branch only a short time before in a case which afforded
some logical basis at least for its application.146

D. Lapse Statutes Affected by the Wills Branch
Notwithstanding its severe criticism for doing so,147 the Iowa
Supreme Court has steadfastly recognized and applied the wills
branch in numerous cases involving the Iowa lapse statute.148
That statute provides in part as follows: "If a devisee die before
the testator, his heirs shall inherit the property devised to him,
unless from the terms of the will a contrary intent is manifest."149
The wills branch plays its vital part by manifesting the "contrary intent" so as to prevent the lapse statute from applying. Here
is the setting frequently found: W dies leaving a will devising to
her husband H "such share of my estate as he is entitled to and
would receive under the laws of the State of Iowa." H predeceases the testatrix leaving four children by a former marriage.
They claim his share under the lapse statute. The testatrix' children by a former marriage claim the whole estate. Who should
prevail?
How can the wills branch possibly determine this question?
The answer is to be found in a curious piece of reasoning. It
runs like this: If H had survived W he would have taken nothing
under the will as a purchaser, but would have taken by descent
since the title by descent is more worthy than the title by purchase. If H, as surviving husband, would have taken nothing
under the will, how can his children occupy any better position
than he? They cannot, says the Iowa Supreme Court, because
the wills branch, which the testator is presumed to know as part
of the law, furnishes the "manifest contrary intent" to prevent the
statute from applying.150 It can thus be seen that but for the wills
branch this ingenious argument could not · be made and title
would pass to H's children under the lapse statute.
146 Beamer

v. Ashby, 204 Okla. 530, 231 P. (2d) 668 (1951).
and Heckel, "Doctrine of Worthier Title," 24 !LI.. L. REv. 627 at 649 et
seq. (1930); notes: 39 IOWA L. REv. 199 (1953); 46 HARV. L. REv. 993 at 998 (1933);
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §312, comment j (1940).
148 The Iowa Supreme Court refers to this statute as the "antilapse" statute.
149 lowa Code (1954) §633.16.
150 Tennant v. Smith, 173 Iowa 264, 155 N.W. 267 (1915); Herring v. Herring, 187
Iowa 593, 174 N.W. 364 (1919); In re Warren's Estate, 211 Iowa 940, 234 N.W. 835 (1931).
147 Harper

482

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 54

Litigation in Iowa involving this question has been considerable. Yet to apply the doctrine seems most distasteful to the
supreme court. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that the
court has gone to great lengths in finding the doctrine to be inapplicable.151 In a recent case the court's displeasure with the rule
was evidenced when it refused to apply it to a will which in fact
gave the surviving spouse, had she survived the testator, exactly
the same estate that she would have taken under the statute of
descent and distribution. But because the will did not say "that
share of my estate which my wife is entitled to receive under the
laws of Iowa," the court refused to apply the wills branch, saying,
we "cannot expand its purpose further. The antilapse statute
was enacted to do away with the common law rule under which
the heirs of a devisee could derive no benefit from the devise if
the devisee predeceased the testator. We are unwilling to minimize the operation of the statute by any further extension of the
'worthier title' doctrine." 152
Though obviously antagonistic toward the doctrine and with
an ear to the ground for arguments against it, there is no doubt
but that the Iowa Supreme Court recognizes it as the law. In its
most recent decision on the subject the court held that "the will
gives the widow the same portion of testator's estate as though he
had died intestate. Cons~quently, the 'worthier title' rule is
applicable and the estate passes to her under the statutes of
descent and distribution and not under the will." 153
E.

Miscellaneous Questions Affected by the Wills Branch

1. Priority of Assets. As a general rule intestate assets will
be resorted to before testate assets in satisfying the claims of
creditors or in paying specific legacies. If, therefore, property
passes by descent because of the wills branch rather than by purchase under the will, it will be taken first. So hold the American
cases.154 An English decision is directly to the contrary.155

151 In re Watenpaugh's Will, 192 Iowa 1178, 186 N.W. 198 (1922); In re Davis' Estate,
204 Iowa 1231, 213 N.W. 395 (1927); Wehrman v. Farmers and Merchants Savings Bank,
221 Iowa 249, 259 N.W. 564 (1935); In re Schroeder's Estate, 228 Iowa 1198, 293 N.W. 492
(1940); In re Everett's Estate, 238 Iowa 564, 28 N.W. (2d) 21 (1947); Beem v. Beem, 241
Iowa 247, 41 N.W. (2d) 107 (1950), noted in 49 MICH. L. REv. 1066 (1951); In re Coleman's
Estate, 242 Iowa 1096, 49 N.W. (2d) 517 (1951).
152 Beem v. Beem, 241 Iowa 247 at 256, 41 N.W. (2d) 107 (1950).
153 In re Miller's Estate, 243 Iowa 920 at 930, 54 N.W. (2d) 433 (1952), 36 A.L.R. (2d)
139.
154 Ellis v. Page, 61 Mass. 161 (1851); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 21 Md. 244 (1864).
155 Biederman v. Seymour, 3 Beav. 368, 49 Eng. Rep. 144 (1840).
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The English case reasons that the rule making intestate assets
first available to creditors is premised on the theory that this is in
accordance with the presumed intention of the · testator. If the
will evinces a contrary intention, then other assets must bear their
pro rata share of the debts. Therefore, if the testator devises land
to his heir it clearly must "have been his intention that the
devisee, who is heir, should partake of his bounty as well as other
devisees." The court consequently held that the heir's land would
only bear the debts ratably with assets devised to others.
The English case is obviously better reasoned, yet the Supreme
Court of Maryland, while expressing "great respect for the very
able judge who delivered the opinion in the case of Biederman
v. Seymour" specifically rejected it.156 It is believed that there
are no American cases-at least the writer has found nonefollowing the English view. 157
2. Pleadings. Some states have statutes which permit a special demurrer for misjoinder of parties.158 In the absence of such
a statute there is some authority at least to the effect that misjoinder of parties may be raised by a general demurrer.159 Many
states also have statutes which provide that only "interested
persons" may contest the probate of a will.160 Under such circumstances the Indiana Supreme Court has held that an heir
who takes by descent rather than by purchase under the will is
not an "interested person" and if he joins with others to contest the
will, it makes the petition subject to demurrer as to all plaintiffs.161
Accordingly, it has been said that "a will which makes no other
disposition of property than the law would make is a nullity, and
not subject to contest."162
F.

Conclusions

What conclusions may properly be drawn as to whether different legal consequences result because of the wills branch? To the
156 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 21 Md. 244 (1864).
1117 In

accord, see note, 46 HARv. L. REv. 993 at 998 (1933), where it is said: "American
courts, however, have failed to perceive and accept the sound reasoning of Biederman v.
Seymour."
1118 CLARK, CoDE PLEADING

§57 (1947).
Co. v. Priest, 131 Ind. 413, 31 N.E. 77 (1892); Wells &: Nellegar Co. v.
Short, 49 Ind. App. 296, 97 N.E. 183 (1912); Cohen v. Ottenheimer, 13 Ore. 220, 10 P. 20
1119 Railroad

(1886).
160 See,

for example, Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937) c. 58, §§29 and 61.
v. Turner, 173 Ind. 593, 89 N.E. 314 (1909).
162 Wheeler v. Loesch, 51 Ind. App. 262, 99 N.E. 502 (1912).
161 Thompson

484

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 54

,\Triter it seems that two general conclusions may be drawn. First,
there are numerous decisions in the United States where different
legal consequences did in fact result because the rule was applied.
Second, there are several distinct fact situations where different
legal consequences may result if the rule is applied.
In drawing these conclusions it is not the intention of the "\\Triter
to be critical in any way of the position taken by the Restatement.
In support of the Restatement's position it must be recognized
that there are numerous cases in which it makes no difference
whatsoever whether the heir takes by descent or pu;chase.163 The
Restatement is certainly warranted in taking the position it has
with respect to those cases.
But what about the cases where it does make a difference?
The Restatement specifically discusses some of the problems presented by those cases. First it discusses the question of the devolution of property being determined by whether it was acquired
by descent or purchase. While recognizing its importance at one
time, the Restatement concludes that in modern law "it is no
longer of any significance."164 It is the "\\Tl'iter's belief, however,
that it may be significant and even determinative under the statutes and cases previously discussed.1611
On the second problem which is discussed, the Restatement
says that it "has been suggested that the rule . . . is significant
today where the question involved is the order in which the assets
of a decedent will be'used to pay debts." But it concludes that
the order in which assets are to be used to pay debts is subject
"to control by the manifest intent of the deceased. The fact
that the deceased has attempted to make a devise to his heirs
shows an intention on his part to attach to the interest which the
heirs may take the consequence of a devise. . . . Thus the rule
that a testator cannot make a devise to his own heirs is of no significance in the solution of these problems."166
The foregoing argument is compelling, sound and reasonable.
It is supported by English authority, but the '\\Triter has been
unable to find any cases in the United States taking that positioJ.?-.167
163 Henry v. Griffith, 242 Ala. 598, 7 S. (2d) 560 (1942); Wiltfang v. Dirksen, 295 Ill.
362, 129 N.E. 159 (1920); In re Shum.way's Estate, 194 Mich. 245, 160 N.W. 595 (1916);
Brittin v. Karrenbrock, (Mo. App. 1945) 186 S.W. (2d) 35; Burton v. Kinney, 191 Tenn.
I, 231 S.W. (2d) 356 (1950).
164PROPERTY REsTATE!IIENT §314, comment j at·l787 (1940).
165 See Part IX-A supra.
166 PROPERTY REsTATE!IIENT §314, comment j at 1787 (1940).
_167 See Part IX-A-I supra.
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Finally, attention is directed in the Restatement to the cases
involving the Iowa lapse statute. The Restatement position is
this: to say that the wills branch could affect the construction of
a lapse statute is a "fallacy . . . easily illustrated." The fallacy
is that the word "devisee" or "legatee" as used in the lapse statute
must mean purported devisee or legatee. Secondly, lapse statutes
"are preeminently concerned with the type of case which involves
a devise to the testator's heirs and to rule out such cases from the
lapse statutes would frequently nullify the significance of such
statutes. Thus it is clear that the application of lapse statutes in
no way depends on whether the heirs, had they survived, would
have taken by descent or by the devise."168
The writer is fully in accord with the argument of the Restatement. It ably points up the fallacies in letting the wills branch
affect the construction of a lapse statute. No court should consider the wills branch in deciding how to construe a lapse statute.
But one Supreme Court has done so and many people who normally would have taken under the lapse statute have been cut
out.109
In support of its position that the wills branch is not an existing rule of law, the Restatement concludes: "In the absence of any
discoverable circumstance in which the rule that a devise to the
heirs of the testator is a nullity has significance in the solution of
modern problems, the rule stated in subsection (2) is justifiable."170
From this conclusion the writer must respectfully dissent, but in
so doing he wishes to make his position unequivocally clear. He
does not wish to be understood as saying, "I am right and the
Restatement is wrong." For after all, as Professor Simes has so
aptly observed, the Restatement is "the 'standard of perfection' in
this field of law." 171 Furthermore, it has been the writer's pleasure
to know and study under some of those esteemed scholars who
worked on the Restatement, and for them he has the highest regard. Therefore, it is suggested that the difference in viewpoint
is twofold: first, all of the cases discussed in this article had not
been reported in 1940,172 and second, as to those cases which were
reported in 1940 there is an honest difference of opinion concerning what they held and how they should be interpreted.
168 PROPERTY RFsrATEMENT

169 See Part IX-D supra.
170PROPERTY RFsrATEMENT

§314, comment j at 1788 (1940).
§314, comment j at 1788 (1940).

171 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTs, Preface, v (1951).
172 The year volume 3 of the Property Restatement

was published.
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THE EXTENT OF RECOGNITION OF THE DOCTRINE
IN THE UNITED STATES

Inasmuch as it seems reasonable to conclude that different
legal consequences may result by applying the rule, the next question is:- to what extent has the rule been recognized? For if the
rule has been expressly recognized in a given jurisdiction, that
fact alone may be vital. That is, if a case arises with the wills
branch being a decisive issue, counsel urging its application will
always point to such decisions, if there are any, in support of their
arguments. They will have the advantage of urging a doctrine
which their own courts have recognized as a common law principle. And this is so even though their own courts may not have
applied the rule in a manner so as to bring about different legal
consequences.
Although several cases recognized the rule at an earlier
date,17 3 it was perhaps largely due to the writings of Chancellor
Kent and the publication of the fourth volume of his Commentaries in 1830 that numerous states have recognized the rule.174
The writer has found decisions in twenty-one jurisdictions where
the wills branch has been recognized. These jurisdictions include Alabama,175 Connecticut,176 Illinois,177 Indiana,178 Iowa,179
173 Barnitz's Les.5ee v. Robert Casey, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 455 (1813); Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169 (1810); Whitney v. Whitney, 14 Mass. 88 (1817); Campbell v. Herron,
1 N.C. 468 (1801); University v. Holstead, 4 N.C. 289 (1816); M'Kay v. Hendon, 7 N.C.
209 (1819); Lessee of Bond v. Swearingen, 1 Ohio 395 (1824).
174 For example, the following cases either quote the rule from Chancellor Kent or cite
him in connection therewith. Bunting v. Speek, 41 Kan. 424, 21 P. 288 (1889); Stilwell v.
Knapper, 69 Ind. 558 (1880); Thompson v. Turner, 173 Ind. 593, 89 N.E. 314 (1909); In
re Warren's Estate, 211 Iowa 940, 234 N.W. 835 (1931); Ellis v. Page, 51 Mass. 161 (1851);
Taylor v. Johnson, 92 Okla. 145, 218 P. 1095 (1923); Beamer v. Ashby, 204 Okla. 530, 231
P. (2d) 668 (1951).
175 Wilcoxen v. Owen, 237 Ala. 169, 185 S. 897 (1938) (dictum in a deed case).
176 Post v. Jackson, 70 Conn. 283, 39 A. 151 (1898).
177 Kellett v. Shepard, 139 III. 433, 28 N.E. 751 (1891); Akers v. Clark, 184 III. 136,
56 N.E. 296 (1900) (dictum in a deed case); Darst v. Swearingen, 224 III. 229, 79 N.E. 635
(1906); Biggerstaff v. Van Pelt, 207 III. 611, 69 N.E. 804 (1904); Wiltfang v. Dirksen, 295
Ill. 362, 129 N.E. 159 (1920); Cooper v. Martin, 308 III. 224, 139 N.E. 68 (1923); McCormick. v. Sanford, 318 Ill. 544, 149 N.E. 476 (1925); Rossiter v. Soper, 384 III. 47, 50 N.E.
(2d) 701 (1943); McNeilly v. Wylie, 389 III. 391, 59 N.E. (2d) 811 (1945); Boldenweck. v.
City Nat. Bank &: Trust Co., 343 III. App. 569, 99 N.E. (2d) 692 (1951).
178 Stilwell v. Knapper, 69 Ind. 558 (1880); Davidson v. Koehler, 76 Ind. 398 (1881);
Robertson v. Robertson, 120 Ind. 333, 22 N.E..310 (1889); Denny v. Denny, 123 Ind. 240,
23 N.E. 519 (1890); McClanahan v. Williams, 136 Ind. 30, 35 N.E. 897 (1893); Rawley v.
Sanns, 141 Ind. 179, 40 N.E. 674 (1895); Thompson v. Turner, 173 Ind. 593, 89 N.E. 314
(1909); Wheeler v. Loesch, 51 Ind. App. 262, 99 N.E. 502 (1912); Dillman v. Fulwider, 57
Ind. App. 632, 105 N.E. 124 (1914).
179 First Nat. Bank v. Willie, 115 Iowa 77, 87 N.W. 734 (1901); Rice v. Burkhart, 130
Iowa 520, 107 N.W. 308 (1906); Tennant v. Smith, 173 Iowa 264, 155 N.W. 267 (1915);
Herring v. Herring, 187 Iowa 593, 174 N.W. 364 (1919); In re Schultz's Estate, 192 Iowa
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Maine,180

Maryland,181 Massachusetts,182 Mississippi,183 New
184
Hampshire,
New York,185 North Carolina,186 Ohio,187 Oklahoma,188 Oregon,189 Pennsylvania,100 South Carolina,191 Tennessee,192 Virginia,193 Wisconsin,194 and the District of Columbia.195
The wills branch has been repudiated and found to be inapplicable in Kentucky196 and Georgia.197
436, 185 N.W. 24 (1921); In re Watenpaugh's Will, 192 Iowa 1178, 186 N.W. 198 (1922);
In re Davis' Estate, 204 Iowa 1231, 213 N.W. 395 (1927); Luglan v. Lenning, 214 Iowa 439,
239 N.W. 692 {1931); In re Warren's Estate, 211 Iowa 940, 234 N.W. 835 (1931); Wehrman
v. Farmers and Merchants Savings Bank, 221 Iowa 249, 259 N.W. 564 (1935); In re $heeler's
Estate, 226 Iowa 650, 284 N.W. 799 (1939); In re Schroeder's Estate, 229 Iowa 1198, 293
N.W. 492 (1940); In re Everett's Estate, 238 Iowa 564, 28 N.W. (2d) 21 (1947); In re
Finch's Estate, 239 Iowa 1069, 32 N.W. (2d) 819 (1948); Beem v. Beem, 241 Iowa 247, 41
N.W. (2d) 107 (1950), noted in 49 MICH. L. REv. 1066 (1951); In re Coleman's Estate, 242
Iowa 1096, 49 N.W. {2d) 517 (1951); In re Miller's Estate, 243 Iowa 920, 54 N.W. (2d) 433,
36 A.L.R. (2d) 139 (1952).
180 Lord v. Bourne, 63 Me. 368, 18 Am. Rep. 234 (1873).
181 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 21 Md. 244 (1864); Donnelly v. Turner, 60 Md. 81 (1883);
Latrobe v. Carter, 83 Md. 279, 34 A. 472 (1896).
182Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169 (1810); Whitney v. Whitney, 14 Mass. 88 (1817);
Ellis v. Page, 61 Mass. 161 (1851); Sears v. Russell, 74 Mass. 86 (1857); Sedgwick v. Minot,
88 Mass. 171 (1863); Thompson v. Thornton, 197 Mass. 273, 83 N.E. 880 (1908); Nat.
Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E. (2d) 113 (1944) (dictum in an inter
vivos trust case).
183 McDaniel v. Allen, 64 Miss. 417, I S. 356 (1887).
184 M'Afee v. Gilmore, 4 N.H. 391 (1828).
185 In re Hawes' Estate, 162 App. Div. 173, 147 N.Y.S. 329 (1914), affd. per curiam
221 N.Y. 613, 116 N.E. 1050 (1917).
186 Campbell v. Herron, 1 N.C. 468 (1801); University v. Holstead, 4 N.C. 289 (1816);
M'Kay v. Hendon, 7 N.C. 209 (1819); Wilkerson v. Bracken, 24 N.C. 315 (1842); Caldwell
v. Black, 27 N.C. 463 (1845); Poisson v. Pettaway, 159 N.C. 650, 75 S.E. 930 (1912);
Yelverton v. Yelverton, 192 N.C. 614, 135 S.E. 632 (1926).
187 Lessee of Bond v. Swearingen, 1 Ohio 395 (1824).
188 United States v. Fooshee, (8th Cir. 1915) 225 F. 521; Taylor v. Johnson, 92 Okla.
145, 218 P. 1095 (1923); Beamer v. Ashby, 204 Okla. 530, 231 P. (2d) 668 (1951); Horton
v. Cronley, (Okla. 1953) 270 P. (2d) 306.
189 Cordon v. Gregg, 164 Ore. 306, 97 P. (2d) 414, rehearing granted 101 P. (2d) 41~
(1940), noted in 20 ORE. L. REv. 164 (1941).
190 Kinney v. Glasgow, 53 Pa. SL Rep. 141 (1866); Donohue v. McNichol, 61 Pa. St.
Rep. 73 (1869); Banes v. Finney, 209 Pa. 191, 58 A. 136 (1904).
101 Seabrook's Exr. v. Seabrook, McMul. Eq. {S.C.) 201 (1841).
192 Hoover"s Lessee v. Gregory, 18 Tenn. 444 (1837); State v. Goldberg's Unknown
Heirs, 113 Tenn. 298, 86 S.W. 717 (1904); McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn. App.
434, 134 S.W. {2d) 197 (1939), cert. den., noted in 16 TENN. L. REv. 358 (1940).
193 Biedler v. Biedler, 87 Va. 300, 12 S.E. 753 (1891); Braswell v. Braswell, 195 Va.
971, 81 S.E. (2d) 560 (1954) (dictum in a deed case).
194In re Root's Will, 81 Wis. 263, 51 N.W. 435 (1892).
195 Landic v. Simms, I App. D.C. 507 (1893). See also Barnitz's Lessee v. Robert Casey,
7 Cranch (II U.S.) 456 (1813).
196 The doctrine was recognized in the early cases. See Tyler v. Fidelity and Columbia
Trust Co., 158 Ky. 280, 164 S.W. 939 (1914); Mcilvaine v. Robson, 161 Ky. 616, 171 S.W.
413 (1914). It was repudiated in Mitchell v. Dauphin Trust Co., 283 Ky. 532, 142 S.W.
(2d) 181 (1940). See also Copeland v. State Bank and Trust Co., 300 Ky. 432, 188 S.W.
(2d) IOI 7 (1945).
197 Lucas v. Parsons, 24 Ga. 640 (1857).
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Because-- it was a part of the English common law, courts in
jurisdictions which have not had occasion to adopt or reject it
may feel compelled to apply it as did the Oregon Supreme Court.198
It therefore has a potential existence in all states which look to
the common law except those which have repudiated it by decision or have abrogated it by statute.199
XL

How

IS THE WILLS BRANCH

APPLIED?

Chancellor Kent has said that the wills branch applies thereby
making the devise void "if it gives precisely the same estate that
the heir would take by descent if the particular devise to him
was omitted qut of the will." 200 But when does a will give "precisely the same estate?" Or, conversely, what provisions in a will
prevent the devise from being "precisely the same estate" and
thereby take the case outside the wills branch? This question has
been the source of much litigation in this country.
·
In answering the question American courts have generally
followed the pattern set in some English cases201 by saying that
the devise to the heir must be of the same quantity and quality.
But the meaning of "quantity" and "quality" as used in the
English decisions bears little resemblance to the meaning of those
words as reflected by the American decisions, as will presently
be seen.
·

A.

The American Concept of Quantity

It ha,s previously been pointed out that the English concept
of "quantity" had reference to tenure, or the nature of the estate
created-namely, whether the heir took a fee simple, a fee tail, or
·a life estate.202 Furthermore, in England the test in applying
the rule, according to Mr. Crosley, "is to strike out of the will
the particular devise to the heir, and then, if without that he would
198 Cordon v. Gregg, 164 Ore. 306, 101 P. (2d) 414 (1940), noted in 20 ORE. L REv.
164 (1941). In Braswell v. Braswell, 195 Va. 971, 81 S.E. (2d) 560 (1954), the Supreme
Court of Vii:ginia was specifically urged to apply the inter vivos branch of the worthier
title doctrine. But in its opinion it is clear that the court considered the rule applicable
to either "the grantor's or testator's heirs." 195 Va. 971 at 973. In commenting on whether
it was obligated to apply the rule, the court said (at 979): "The common law rule, not
having been abrogated in Virginia, is controlling." Italics added.
.
199 For a discussion of the effect of statutes on the rule, see Part XII infra.
200 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES, 14th ed., 506 (1896).
201 See Part V supra.
202 See Part V-A supra.
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take by descent exactly the same estate which the devise purports
to give him, he is in by descent and not by purchase."203
While some early American cases adhere to the English view, 204
radical departure is frequently found. Thus ma1:1y decisions
clearly suggest the test to be this: if the heir takes the same estate
which he would have taken had the testator died intestate, then
the rule applies.205 This has been referred to by Professors Harper
and Heckel as the so-called value, amount, or proportion test.206
It is, of course, completely foreign to the English concept of
"quantity." Seldom does the will give the heir the same amount,
proportion or value of the estate that he would have taken had
the testator died intestate. Thus it has been held that the wills
branch does not apply if the heir gets either a lesser share207 or
a greater share208 of the estate than he would have taken by intestacy. One case has even held that since the share of one heir
could be increased if another heir contested the will, contrary to
the terms of a no-contest clause, this fact alone would prevent
the heir from taking the same quantity of estate as he would have
taken by intestacy.209 Likewise, a provision iri a will directing
the sale of land and the distribution of the proceeds to the heir
has been said to prevent the operation of the rule because if the
testator had died intestate the heir would have taken the land
itself and not the proceeds therefrom. 210
203 4 KENT, CoMME.NTARIES, 14th ed., 507 (1896), citing CROSLEY's TREATISE ON WILIS
IOI (1828). Italics added.
204 Whitney v. Whitney, 14 Mass. 88 (1817); Ellis v. Page, 61 Mass. 161 (1851). Cf.
Yelverton v. Yelverton, 192 N.C. 614, 135 S.E. 632 (1926).
205 Post v. Jackson, 70 Conn. 283, 39 A. 151 (1898); Landic v. Simms, 1 App. D.C. 507
(1893); Biggerstaff v. Van Pelt, 207 Ill. 611, 69 N.E. 804 (1904); Rossiter v. Soper, 384 Ill.
47, 50 N.E. (2d) 701 (1943); First Nat. Bank v. Willie, 115 Iowa 77, 87 N.W. 734 (1901);
Thompson v. Thornton, 197 Mass. 273, 83 N.E. 880 (1908); McDaniel v. Allen, 64 Miss.
417, 1 S. 356 (1887); University v. Holstead, 4 N.C. 289 (1816).
206 Harper and Heckel, "Doctrine of Worthier Title," 24 ILL. L. REv. 627 at 648 and

~~~

.

re Everett's Estate, 238 Iowa 564, 28 N.W. (2d) 21 (1947); In re Coleman's
Estate, 242 Iowa 1096, 49 N.W. (2d) 517 (1951); Taylor v. Johnson, 92 Okla. 145, 218 P.
1095 (1923).
208 Rice v. Burkhart, 130 Iowa 520, 107 N.W. 308 (1906); In re Watenpaugh's Will,
192 Iowa 1178, 186 N.W. 198 (1922); In re Schroeder's Estate, 228 Iowa 1198, 293 N.W.
492 (1940); Beamer v. Ashby, 204 Okla. 530, 231 P. (2d) 668 (1951); Kenney v. Glasgow,
53 Pa. St. Rep. 141 (1866).
209 Luglan v. Lenning, 214 Iowa 439, 239 N.W. 692 (1931).
210 Darst v. Swearingen, 224 Ill. 229, 79 N.E. 635 (1906); In re Sheeler's Estate, 226
Iowa 650, 284 N.W. 799 (1939).
207 In
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The American Concept of Quality

The English cases, in holding that the estate had to be of the
same quality, referred to whether the heir took his interest in severalty, as a joint tenant, -as a coparcenar, or as a tenant in common.
In other words, if the heir would have taken as a joint tenant under
the will, but as a tenant in common had the devise been stricken
from the will, the quality of the estate was not the same in both
cases and the rule would not apply. 211 This view has quite properly been followed in this country by some courts.212 However,
its importance in modern times has been somewhat diminished.
In many states a devise of land by T to A and B, his heirs at law,
will invest them with the title as tenants in common under the
will. Had T died intestate they would likewise have been tenants
in common. Hence, the quality is the same in either case.
The English courts were also called upon to decide whether
a charge, an executory interest, a power of sale, or a devise in
trust would so change the quality of the estate devised to the heir
as to prevent the rule from applying. For example, suppose T
devised land to H, his sole heir at law, subject to a charge of $500
which H was required to pay his brother. The English courts
held that the existence of the charge did not prevent the application of the rule. 213 The same was true although the devise to the
heir was subject to an executory interest or power of sale.214 Some
of the American cases adhere to the English view.216 However, in
other cases it has been held that a charge216 or a power of sale217
will prevent the rule from applying. These latter decisions again
point up the fact that some courts are eager to find a reason for
refusing to apply the wills branch.218
211 See Part IV-B supra.
212 Donnelly v. Turner,

60 Md. 81 (1883); M'Afee v. Gilmore, 4 N.H. 391 (1828);
Campbell v. Herron, 1 N.C. 468 (1801).
213 See Part V-B-(1) supra.
214 See Part V-B-(2) and (4) supra.
215 Whitney v. Whitney, 14 Mass. 88 (1817); Lessee of Bond v. Swearingen, 1 Ohio
395 (1824); Kenney v. Glasgow, 53 Pa. St. Rep. 141 (1866); Banes v. Finney, 209 Pa. 191,
58 A. 136 (1904).
216 Davis' Estate, 204 Iowa 1231, 213 N.W. 395 (1927); Wehrman v. Farmers and
Merchants Savings Bank, 221 Iowa 249, 259 N.W. 564 (1935).
217 Dillman v. Fulwider, 57 Ind. App. 632, 105 N.E. 124 (1914).
· 21s Two Oklahoma decisions clearly demonstrate how far some courts will go in
attempting to find reasons not to apply the rule. In each case the court pointed to the
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On the question of whether a trust will prevent the wills
branch from applying, the only American cases which have really
considered the question have held that a trust will not prevent
the rule from applying. 219 These cases are unusual in view of the
fact that some American courts, as we have seen, look for reasons
to take cases outside the scope of the doctrine. They are even
more unusual when it is remembered that the English courts have
on occasion refused to apply the doctrine if a trust were involved.220
C.

Is the Devise Void?

"The devise to the heirs is void." Statements to that effect are
frequently found in decisions which recognize and announce the
wills branch as part of the common law.221 But these statements
stem basically from the English cases where the statement was
literally true because of the doctrine of primogeniture.222 If,
therefore, the devise to the heir at law was void he would of necessity take the land by descent, because the eldest son inherited to
the exclusion of his brothers and sisters. The eldest son was the
heir at law.223
fact that different legal consequences would result if the rule were applied and because
of that fact it stated that quite obviously the "quality of the estate" was not the same.
See Taylor v. Johnson, 92 Okla. 145, 218 P. 1095 (1923); Beamer v. Ashby, 204 Okla. 530,
231 P. (2d) 668 (1951).
219 Ellis v. Page, 61 Mass. 161 (1851); Cordon v. Gregg, 164 Ore. 306, 101 P. (2d) 414
(1940). In the following cases trusts were involved and while it was not discussed there
is no suggestion that a trust prevents the rule from applying. Kellett v. Shepard, 139 Ill.
433, 28 N.E. 751 (1891); Boldenweck v. City Nat. Bank&: Trust Co., 343 Ill. App. 569, 99
N.W. (2d) 692 (1951); Latrobe v. Carter, 83 Md. 279, 34 A. 472 (1896); Parsons v.
Winslow, 6 Mass. 145 (1810).
220 See Section V-B-(3) supra.
.221 Kellett v. Shepard, 139 Ill. 433, 28 N.E. 751 (1891); Darst v. Swearingen, 224 Ill.
229, 79 N.E. 635 (1906); Rossiter v. Soper, 384 Ill. 47, 50 N.E. (2d) 701 (1943); Stilwell v.
Knapper, 69 Ind. 558 (1880); Denny v. Denny, 123 Ind. 240, 23 N.E. 519 (1890); Wheeler
v. Loesch, 51 Ind. App. 262, 99 N.E. 502 (1912); Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169 (1810);
Whitney v. Whitney, 14 Mass. 88 (1817); M'Afee v. Gilmore, 4 N.H. 391 (1828); Campbell
v. Herron, I N.C. 468 (180_1); University v. Holstead, 4 N.C. 289 (1816); In re Root's Will,
81 Wis. 263, 51 N.W. 435 (1892). The writer of the comment in 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv.
507 at 507 makes this statement: "Thus if a will devises various life estates with remainders
over to the legal heirs of the testator and then contains a residuary gift over to others, the
heirs do not take anything, but their devise or legacy goes back into the testator's estate
and then to the residuary takers." No cases are cited in support of this statement.
222 See Part IV-A supra.
223 If the decedent had only daughters they all constituted the "heir" and took as
coparceners. The rule did not apply to a devise to daughters because the quality of the
estate was different. See Part IV-B supra.
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· But in the United Stc!,tes primogeniture does not obtain and
if a man dies leaving several children, not one, but all of them
are his heirs. Suppose, therefore, T has two sons, A and B. He
wishes to disinherit A. He therefore devises one half of his land
to Band one half to X, a stranger. Now, is the devise to B really
void? If it is, then the land will descend to both T's heirs, namely
A and B, thereby permitting A to inherit contrary to his father's
wishes. The writer has found no American case which has applied
the wills branch so as to bring about this legal consequence.224
It therefore seems proper that the oft-repeated statement "the
devise to the heir is void" must be tempered by the actual holdings in the cases.

D.

The Form of the Devise

One significant point of difference exists between the inter
vivos branch and the wills b:r:anch. It is with respect to the form
of the limitation. The inter vivos branch applies only to those
cases where an end limitation is in form to the heirs at law or
next of kin of the grantor.225 With the wills branch such is not
the case. If the devise is to persons who are in fact heirs of the
testator at the time of his death the wills branch will apply whether
the testator refers to them individually,226 mentions them as a
class, such as children,227 or refers to them as his "heirs at law."228
224See, however, Mdlvaine v. Robinson, 161 Ky. 616, 171 S.W. 413 (1914), and the
comment thereon in Mitchell v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 283 Ky. 532 at 537, 142 S.W.
(2d) 181 (1940), where it is suggested that the wills branch did give an heir an interest
in land which she would not have received had the wills branch not been applied. See
also Rawley v. Sanns, 141 Ind. 179, 40 N.E. 674 (1895), and M'Kay v. Hendon, 7 N.C. 209
(1819).
225 See Morris, "Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine," 2 OKLA. L. REv.
133 at 149 (1949).
226 Rossiter v. Soper, 384 Ill. 47, 50 N.E. (2d) 701 (1943); Stilwell v. Knapper, 69 Ind.
558 (1880); Thompson v. Turner, 173 Ind. 593, 89 N.E. 314 (1909); Tennant v. Smith, 173
Iowa 264, 155 N.W. 267 (1915); Herring v. Herring, 187 Iowa 593, 174 N.W. 364 (1919);
In re Warren's Estate, 211 Iowa 940, 234 N.W. 835 (1931); In r1e Miller's Estate, 243 Iowa
920, 54 N.W. (2d) 433 (1952); Hoover's Lessee v. Gregory, 18 Tenn. 444 (1837); University
v. Holstead, 4 N.C. 289 (1816).
227 Robertson v. Robertson, 120 Ind. 333, 22 N.E. 310 (1889); Davidson v. Koehler, 76
Ind. 398 (1881).
22s Kellett v. Shepard, 139 Ill. 433, 28 N.E. 751 (1891); Wiltfang v. Dirksen, 295 Ill.
362, 129 N.E. 159 (1920). But in Post v. Jackson, 70 Conn. 283, 39 A. 151 (1898), it was
strongly suggested that the form of the limitation had to be the "lawful heirs" of the
testator before the wills branch would apply. Likewise, in the recent case of Boldenweck
v. City Nat. Bank &: Trust Co., 343 Ill. App. 569, 99 N.E. (2d) 692 (1951), the court
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The wills branch therefore is much broader in scope because it
applies to both present and future interests and likewise is not
dependent upon an exact form of limitation before it comes into
play.

E.

A Rule of Law

There would appear to be no doubt that in England the wills
branch was applied as a rule of law.229 In the United States the
same conclusion seems justified.230 That is to say, the writer has
found no decision which has treated the rule as one designed to
aid the court in ascertaining the probable intention of the testator. It is true that in Iowa it has been inferred that the rule may
be one of construction since it constitutes the springboard upon
which a court can find a "manifest intent" that the testator would
not want the lapse statute applied to his will.231 Likewise, it is
suggested in two early Illinois cases that the rule is one of construction.232 However, on the whole it clearly seems to be applied
as a rule of law. Indeed, it would appear that the principal reason some courts go so far to find facts making the rule inapplicable is to avoid its heavy hand. 233

F.

Personal Property

The wills branch having its origin in ancient feudal land
law might logically be presumed to have no application to personal property. Especially would this seem to follow since even
observed (at 590): "The rule upon which plaintiffs rely applies only to limitations of
remainders to right heirs. Manifestly, the rule cannot apply where from the will, as a
whole, it appears that the testator used the word 'heirs' in a sense other than right heirs."
229 See

Part II•C supra.
v. Soper, 384 Ill. 47, 50 N.E. (2d) 701 (1943); Davidson v. Koehler, 76
Incl. 398 (1881); In re Warren's Estate, 211 Iowa 940, 234 N.W. 835 (1931); Latrobe v.
Carter, 83 Md. 279, 34 A. 472 (1896); Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169 (1810); Whitney v.
Whitney, 14 Mass. 88 (1817); Ellis v. Page, 61 Mass. 161 (1851); University v. Holstead,
4 N.C. 289 (1816); Yelverton v. Yelverton, 192 N.C. 614, 135 S.E. 632 (1926); United States
v. Fooshee, (8th Cir. 1915) 225 F. 521 (1915); Cordon v. Gregg, 164 Ore. 306, 97 P. (2d)
732, rehearing granted, 101 P. (2d) 414 (1940); Hoover's Lessee v. Gregory, 18 Tenn. 444
(1837). See also the cases cited in notes 175 to 195 supra.
231 Beem v. Beem, 241 Iowa 247, 41 N.W. (2d) 107 (1950), noted in 49 MICH. L. REv.
1066 (1951).
232 Kellett v. Shepard, 139 Ill. 433, 28 N.E. 751 (1891); Wiltfang v. Dirksen, 295 Ill.
362, 129 N.E. 159 (1920).
233 See Part XI-A and B supra.

230 Rossiter
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in the United States it is generally regarded as a rule of law. Surprisingly, however, there are a few decisions which actually apply
the doctrine to personal property.234 Moreover, some courts while
not squarely passing on the point have clearly indicated that the
rule is applicable to personal property. 235
However, in most jurisdictions when the wills branch has been
urged the subject matter of the action has been land. Accordingly
it seems correct to say that as a rule of property based on feudal concepts, as distinguished from a rule of construction, the doctrine
should be applied only to real property.236

XII.

STATUTORY ABOLITION

A recent decision by the Iowa Supreme Court points up the
fact that the wills branch was abolished in England thirteen years
before Iowa became a state.237 As compared to its treatment in
England the rule has fared much better in the hands of American
legislators. In this country it has been abrogated by statute only
in Kansas,238 Nebraska, 239 and Illinois.240 In addition, Minnesota
has a statute the effect of which probably abolishes the rule. 241
Partial abolition may result in states having statutes which provide in effect that the word "heirs" is to be treated as a word of
purchase.242 And, as previously pointed out, the rule has received
judicial repudiation in Georgia243 and Kentucky. 244
For a rule of law which has no useful purpose it is somewhat
234 In re Warren's Estate, 211 Iowa 940, 234 N.W. 835 (1931); Thompson v. Turner,
173 Ind. 593, 89 N.E. 314 (1909); Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169 (1810).
235 Robertson v. Robertson, 120 Ind. 333, 22 N.E. 310 (1889); Denny v. Denny, 123
Ind. 240, 23 N.E. 519 (1890); In re Hawes' Estate, 162 App. Div. 173, 147 N.Y.S. 329 (1914),
affd. per curiam, 221 N.Y. 613, 116 N.E. 1050 (1917).
236 Lord v. Bourne, 63 Me. 368, 18 Am. St. Rep. 234 (1873); Cordon v. Gregg, 164 Ore.
306, 97 P. (2d) 732, rehearing granted 101 P. (2d) 414 (1940).
237 Beem v. Beem, 241 Iowa 247, 41 N.W. (2d) 107 at 112 (1950).
238 Kan. Gen. Stat. (1949) §58-506.
239 Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §76-114.
240 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) §188.
241 Minn. Stat. (1953) §500.14 (4).
242 Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1953) §108; 20 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950) §180.14 (4).
243 Lucas v. Parsons, 24 Ga. 640 (1857).
244 Mitchell v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 283 Ky. 532, 142 S.W. (2d) 181 (1940).
See also Copeland v. State Bank and Trust Co., 300 Ky. 432, 188 S.W. (2d) 1017 (1945).
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surprising that it has not received the same legislative "treatment"
which the rule in Shelley's case has received. 245 The reason it has
not lies, perhaps, in the fact that it is not universally well known.

XIII.

CONCLUSION

What meritorious arguments can be made in favor of the wills
branch of the worthier title doctrine? The writer can think of
none. The rule invites litigation, ensnares the unwary draftsman and frustrates the wary draftsman. As a rule of law it applies
to devises made to people who are ~e most natural objects of
the testator's bounty. To the writer's knowledge, every man
who has taken up the pen to write on the policy aspects of the rule
has concluded that it has no place in our law.246 Such unanimity
of opinion from all segments of our profession is seldom seen.
There is one argument to be made in favor of the rule when
it is applied to prevent a renunciation by the heir to the detriment of his creditors.247 However, the answer to that problem
is to enact legislation placing the heir and devisee in exactly the
same position in so far as legal consequences are concerned. In
other words, renunciation should be permitted as to both or
denied as to both.248
It is the writer's view that if the legislatures of every state,
which have not already done so, would adopt the proposed stat245 PROPERTY REsrATEMENT §313 (1948 Supp.) shows thirty-six jurisdictions have abolished the rule in Shelley's Case by statute in whole or in part.
246 "The purpose for the application of the doctrine of worthier title at common law
finds no support in our law." McNeilly v. Wylie, 389 III. 391 at 393, 59 N.E. (2d) 811
(1945); " .•. the doctrine of worthier title serves to hinder, rather than aid, in the ascertainment of the intention of a testator, which is the cardinal purpose in the construction
of wills and that it has no place in our jurisprudence." Mitchell v. Dauphin Deposit
Trust Co., 283 Ky. 532 at 538, 142 S.W. (2d) 181 (1940); "The reason for the rule in
England, to that effect, does not apply in this state." Lucas v. Parsons, 24 Ga. 640 at 659
(1857); "In its original form it had no relation to the genius of our laws." Beem v.
Beem, 241 Iowa 247 at 255, 41 N.W. (2d) 107 (1950), noted in 49 MICH. L. REv. 1066
(1951); "But a vestige, a survival of ancient legal theory, it serves no genuine social purpose, if accurately applied." Harper and Heckel, "Doctrine of Worthier Title," 24 Iu.. L.
REY. 627 at 655 (1930); "It is hoped that the Iowa court will eliminate this antiquated
doctrine from the Iowa law." Note, 39 IowA L. REv. 199 at 202 (1953).
247 See Part IX-B supra.
248 See, for example, MODEL PROBATE CODE §58 (1946).
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ute of the American Law Institute and the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws abolishing the rule, the land would be rid
of an outmoded doctrine. 249
249 "When any property is limited, mediately or immediately, in an othenvise effec•
tive testamentary conveyance, in form or in effect, to the heirs or next of kin of the conveyor, or to a person or persons who on the death of the conveyor are some or all of his
heirs or next of kin, such conveyees acquire the property by purchase and not by descent."
Uniform Property Act §14.

